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DEREGULATING VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS
Michael E. Solimine*
Amy E. Lippert**
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) and its state law counterparts permit, under
certain circumstances, a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss her lawsuit without
tnjudice. Within certain windows of opportunity, plaintiffs can take this unilat-
eral action without the permission of the defendant or of the court, and without
any conditions attached. When those windows are closed, plaintiffs can still seek
dismissal with the approval of the defendant or of the court. This regime is prob-
lematic: giving plaintiffs this unilateral power is an anachronism in an age of
managerial judging, and can be considerably inconvenient for defendants. Like-
wise, the case law has developed an unwieldy set offactors to guide trial courts in
attaching conditions to the plaintff seeking dismissal of a case.
This article advances several ways to rationalize voluntary dismissals. While Fed-
eral Rule 41(a) and its state law counterparts need some refinement, this article
endorses their allowing a small window of opportunity at the beginning of a suit
for plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice, with no conditions attached. When that
window closes, plaintiff can still obtain dismissal of her suit, either by obtaining
the defendant's or the court's permission. With regard to the latter, the presumptive
sole condition should be an award of reasonable attorneys'fees from plaintiff to de-
fendant. Among the advantages of this condition is that it is much easier to
administer than the current standards, fits comfortably within the language of
Rule 41(a), avoids some of the pitfalls of loser pay proposals, and in part codifies
the existing practice of many courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a lawsuit is filed, it is usually the defendant who considers
ways to have the suit dismissed by motion. On occasion, however,
and for a variety of reasons, the plaintiff may desire to discontinue
the litigation by dismissing her own suit. Federal Rule of Civil
* Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A.,
Wright State University (1978);J.D., Northwestern University (1981).
** Law Clerk to U.S. Magistrate Judge Nancy Vecchiarelli, United States District
Court, Northern District of Ohio. B.A., University of Michigan (1998); J.D., University of
Cincinnati (2001). Member, Ohio Bar.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the University of Cincinnati College of
Law Summer Scholarship Series, and we benefited from the comments received there, as
well as those by Bob Bone, Lonny Hoffman, Richard Myers, Tom Rowe, Gina Saelinger and
David Skidmore, and U.S. District Judge Walter Rice and U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael
Merz. We are responsible for any errors that remain.
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Procedure 41(a) (1),' along with its state law counterparts permits
the plaintiff to do this under certain circumstances. Even when the
plaintiff has lost the opportunity to voluntarily dismiss the case,
Rule 41 (a) (2) allows the plaintiff to petition the court for such
dismissal, subject to any conditions the court may attach.
1. The entirety of Rule 41 reads as follows:
Rule 41. Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States, an ac-
tion may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the
adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judg-
ment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dis-
missal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by
a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United
States or of any state an action based on or including the same
claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counter-
claim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon
the defendant of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action
shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudi-
cation by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: EFFECT THEREOF. For failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a de-
fendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the
defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise speci-
fies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided
for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for im-
proper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as
an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) DISMISSAL OF COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS-CLAIM, OR THIRD-PARTY CLAIM.
The provisions of this nile apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant
alone pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule shall be
made before a responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before
the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) COSTS OF PREVIOUSLY-DISMISSED ACTION. If a plaintiff who has once
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or
including the same claim against the same defendant, the court may
make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously dis-
missed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the
action until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
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So described, the various ways a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss
her case may not seem a particularly cutting-edge topic in civil pro-
cedure. Many civil procedure casebooks either do not mention the
topic at all,2 or devote but a handful of pages to the issue.3 Evi-
dently, the issue is underappreciated. Firm numbers are difficult to
come by, but it appears that plaintiffs use, or seek to use, this op-
tion in an appreciable number of cases.4 This is not surprising,
because plaintiffs can use the option strategically. If the case ap-
pears weak after filing, or for other reasons the forum is not
favorable, the plaintiff can dismiss and possibly refile elsewhere.
Likewise, the voluntary dismissal option can encourage litigation
by increasing the value of the suit to the plaintiff. The option ar-
guably makes it easier to file suit; it thus in effect enhances the
value of the suit.
5
Voluntary dismissals can arise in high-profile litigation. Consider
the recent defamation suit filed in the federal district court for the
District of Columbia by Sidney Blumenthal, then a presidential
aide, against cybergossip columnist Matt Drudge during the
Clinton impeachment controversy.6 The suit was filed late in 1997,
and was followed by several years of seemingly interminable
settlement discussions, disputes, and motions over personal
jurisdiction, discovery, and other issues, as well as a long string of
rulings by the district judge. Late in 2000, the trial court rendered
a decision on a discovery motion that in effect would have required
2. See BARBARA ALAN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2001); A. LEO LEVIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2000); LINDAJ.
SILBERMAN & ALLAN R. STEIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001).
3. SeeJoHNJ. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 943-44 (8th ed. 2001); DAVID CRUMP
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 509-10 (4th ed. 2001); RICHARD D.
FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS
332-34 (3d ed. 2001); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE
AND FEDERAL 1002-03 (8th ed. 1999); ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 922-24 (2003); FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
703 (5th ed. 2001); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH
204-06 (3d ed. 2000); JEFFREY A. PARNESS, CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS 669-70 (2001); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE,
AND CONTEXT 504 (2000); LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHIrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 816-18
(2d ed. 2000).
One leading case book reduced its coverage of the topic from six pages (including a re-
printed case) to three pages in the most recent edition. Cf MARCUS, supra, at 204-06, with
RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 196-201 (2d ed.
1995).
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 173 (1990).
6. For an extensive discussion and analysis of the case, see Roger Parloff, If This Ain't
Libel.... 4 BRILL'S CONTENT 94 (Fall 2001).
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the plaintiffs-Blumenthal and his wife, Jacqueline-to take
numerous other depositions before deposing the defendant! Early
in 2001, having spent tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys'fees
up to that point and facing the prospect of paying still more, "the
Blumenthals just wanted out."" In other words, they wanted to
voluntarily dismiss this suit, but they couldn't do so unilaterally,
because that opportunity had long since passed under Rule
41(a) (1). They could have approached the judge under Rule
41 (a) (2). Apparently uncertain of the conditions the district judge
may have attached to such a dismissal (including the possible
payment of attorneys' fees to defendant), plaintiffs stipulated with
defendant for a dismissal, with $2500 being paid to Drudge per
Rule 41 (a) (1) (ii). 9
As the Blumenthal litigation illustrates, plaintiffs may wish to dis-
miss their lawsuits in lieu of settlement or a resolution on the
merits. Early in a suit, for example, a plaintiff might be on the los-
ing end of a court decision, such as the denial of a motion for a
preliminary injunction. Later on in a suit, mounting expenses or
unfavorable prospects for obtaining relief might convince the
plaintiff abandon the action. The current civil procedure regime in
federal courts, and in most states, presents a complex set of options
to the plaintiff who simply wants out of the suit. The balance of this
Article describes the current regime, discusses its problematic as-
pects, and suggests avenues for reform.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II outlines the current
regulation of voluntary dismissal. It begins with a brief history of
the right of voluntary dismissal, noting that both federal and state
rules have retreated from the expansive right plaintiffs enjoyed at
common law. Federal Rule 41(a) (1) (i) gives the plaintiff a small
window at the beginning of the suit to dismiss unconditionally,
without prejudice. Most states do the same, though about a dozen
provide for wider windows than does the federal system. Whatever
7. Id. at 111.
8. Id. at 112.
9. Id. at 112-13. For another high-profile defamation case involving Rule 41(a) in the
same judicial district as Blumenthal, see Robertson v. McCloskey, 121 F.R.D. 131 (D.D.C. 1988)
(in which a suit by television minister and Presidential candidate Pat Robertson against a
member of Congress was dismissed under Rule 41(a)(2) on the condition of payment of
almost $30,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to defendant). Indeed, perhaps the Blumenthals
considered the result in Robertson as they pondered their options under Rule 41(a). Pre-
sumably Drudge did too, and in theory he could have held out for a Rule 41 (a) (2) dismissal.
We can only speculate why he did not do so. There was no guarantee that the plaintiffs
would enjoy the same result as the defendant in Robertson, and perhaps Drudge, too, had
simply grown tired of the case, and was willing to settle for a virtually nominal amount.
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the window is, once it closes, the plaintiff (absent settling with the
defendant) needs the permission of the court to dismiss her case,
per Federal Rule 41(a) (2), as well as its state counterparts. Those
rules typically do not specify under what circumstances, and with
what conditions, courts should grant such permission. Part II con-
cludes with a survey of cases that have interpreted those rules.
Part III of the Article turns to the problematic aspects of current
procedure. Initially, it addresses whether there should be any right
of unconditional, voluntary dismissal at all. Such a broad right
seems a vestige of common law civil practice and out of step with
modern notions of managerial judging. It then addresses the com-
plex and sometimes bewildering set of factors courts have
developed to determine when a plaintiff should be able to dismiss
her case.
In a parallel fashion, Part IV of the article suggests reforms for
Rule 41 (a). On the right of voluntary dismissal itself, the current
federal rule gets it mostly right. A very limited right of uncondi-
tional dismissal is better than a very broad right, or no such option
at all. As for the conditions courts attach to plaintiffs' requests for
dismissal, the complicated set of factors most courts apply is subop-
timal. A better approach is to automatically grant requests for
dismissal without prejudice, subject to only one condition: that
plaintiffs pay the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred up to that
point by the defendant. This approach is better than the current
plethora of factors because it is easier for courts to administer, is
fairer to both plaintiffs and defendants, and reflects an emerging
consensus in cases interpreting Rule 41 (a) (2).
II. VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS: THE STATUS Quo
A. Plaintiff's Unilateral Right to Voluntarily Dismiss
1. History-In common law civil practice, a plaintiff had a
broad right to dismiss her case without prejudice, thereby retaining
the option to bring another suit on the same grounds. Early on, it
appears, the plaintiff could take a dismissal even after a verdict had
been rendered.' ° The right to dismiss was later limited to the time
10. Neil C. Head, The History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 20, 23 (1920).
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before a verdict was rendered." Either way, the plaintiff was placed
at a decided advantage over the defendant. To state the obvious,
the plaintiff could simply abandon the suit, and perhaps try again
later, if things did not go well. The defendant had no such option.
The distinction did not trouble common law lawyers, for "plaintiff
was viewed as the master of his case until ajudgment was rendered,
and therefore was permitted to dismiss the case voluntarily and
without prejudice anytime prior to judgment."
12
Typically by statute or rule, states have codified a plaintiff's right
to voluntarily dismiss, but have subjected it to varying conditions.
Some states remove the right only when a judgment or verdict is
entered, very much like common law practice.13 Other states set the
cut-off time at earlier points in the litigation, such as before the
jury retired to deliberate, before the case went to trial, or before an
answer was filed.
14
2. Federal Practice-Prior to the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts, pursuant to the Confor-
mity Act, 5 generally followed the state practice regarding voluntary
dismissal found in the forum state in actions at law. In actions in
equity, by contrast, "the plaintiff had a qualified right to dismiss at
any time before an interlocutory or final decree was entered unless
the defendant would suffer some prejudice beyond the threat of
another suit."'
6
The Federal Rules promulgated in 1938 retained a dismissal op-
tion for plaintiffs but narrowly restricted its scope. Rule 41 (a) (1) (i)
stated that the option to dismiss "without order of court" could be
exercised "by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by an adverse party of an answer.'' 17 Rule 41(a) (1) (ii) permits "a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in
the action."' When exercised, the latter option typically reflects a
11. See id.; Paul M. Lipkin, Note, The Right of a Plaintiff to Take a Voluntary Nonsuit or to
Dismiss His Action Without Prejudice, 37 VA. L. REV. 969, 969-70 (1951)(hereinafter Lipkin).
12. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 468 (3d ed. 1999) (footnote omit-
ted).
13. Lipkin, supra note 11, at 971-72.
14. Id. at 971-86.
15. Act ofJune 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197, Rev. Stat. § 914, repealed byAct ofJune
25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1994)).
16. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2363, at 253 (2d ed. 1994) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
17. FED. R. CiV. P. 41(a) (1) (i).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1) (ii).
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settlement among all of the parties.' 9 Rule 41 (a) (1) goes on to state
that any dismissal is "without prejudice," unless otherwise stated in
the notice of dismissal.20 This means that the plaintiff can in theory
file one more lawsuit. This point is confirmed by the Rule's affir-
mation that a second dismissal will be considered an adjudication
on the merits, thus barring any further lawsuits, in federal court at
least, due to res judicata.2' Finally, the Rule is made subject to the
provisions of Rule 23(e) . That provision makes "dismissal [s] or
compromise [s]" of class actions subject to court approval 3 So an
otherwise unilateral voluntary dismissal in class action cases under
Rule 41 (a) (1) (i) needs court approval.24
19. See McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 1985); Michael E.
Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretation of Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 295, 302 (1988).
20. FED. R. CI. P. 41 (a) (1).
21. ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 97 (2001); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2368. Our
observation is limited to actions refiled in federal court, for it is possible that the plaintiff
might be able to refile a suit in state court, free of preclusion problems. This possibility is
suggested by Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), which
held that the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment in the first case, dismissing a
diversity action on statute of limitations grounds, is determined by law of the state where the
federal court sits in an action refiled in state court.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1).
23. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e).
24. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2363, at 256. Given the lack of discussion in
the Advisory Committee Note, see note 25 infra, it may not be entirely clear why the excep-
tion was made for class action cases. Presumably it is due in large part for the same reasons
that Rule 23(e) exists in the first instance, namely, to enable the court to protect the inter-
ests of the members of the class. See Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and
Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56 (1999). Rule 41 (a) and class
actions can intersect in various ways. A putative class representative may, for example, seek
to dismiss a case where the class has not yet been certified, WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
16, § 2363, at 256 n.8 (summarizing examples), or a member of a certified class may seek to
use Rule 41 (a) (2) in an attempt to opt out, see In re Painewebber Limited Partnerships Liti-
gation, 147 E3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to permit such a dismissal). We have not
uncovered an instance of a class representative seeking to dismiss, under Rule 41 (a) (1) (i) or
(a) (2), a certified class. So while Rule 23(e) mandates that "dismissals" or "compromises" of
class actions are subject to court approval, it appears that most times courts are asked to
approve the latter, not the former. This phenomenon is not surprising, since it is rarely in
the plaintiffs' interests to voluntarily dismiss a certified class action, either unilaterally or by
motion. A certified class action gives enormous bargaining power to the plaintiff, evidenced
by the fact that many class actions settle soon after certification. See Michael E. Solimine &
Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by
the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 230, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1531, 1546 & n.74
(2000); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 142-46 (1996).
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Why the rulemakers created this type of voluntary dismissal op-
tion is unclear.25 While some authorities suggest that Rule
41(a)(1)(i) codified the aforementioned, pre-1938 equity prac-
• 2 6 2
tice, the initial Advisory Committee Note barely says anything.
25. Charles Clark, while Dean at Yale Law School, was the initial Reporter to the Rules
Advisory Committee and wrote voluminously on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during
and after their adoption, and later when he served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. But a review of many of his considerable writings on the Federal Rules
(summarized in Peter Charles Hoffer, Judge Charles Edward Clark, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 767
(1993) (book review)) reveals that Judge Clark barely makes any reference to, much less
discusses, Rule 41(a). For example, there is no mention of Rule 41(a) in one of his best-
known books, CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (2d ed.
1947). Likewise, Judge Clark did not author any opinion that discussed Rule 41 (a). For an
extensive study of Judge Clark's judicial rulings regarding civil procedure, which has no
mention of Rule 41 (a), see Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1976). Due to a lack of access, Clark's personal papers and
the unpublished notes and working papers of the original Advisory Committee were not
directly examined for this Article, though possibly relevant. For discussion of those sources,
see Peter Charles Hoffer, Text, Translation, Context, Conversation, Preliminary Notes for Decoding
the Deliberations of the Advisory Committee that Wrote the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 Am. J.
LEGAL HIST. 409 (1993); Judith Resnik, Tial as Error Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924,935-41 (2000).
One recent article has discussed the intent of the framers of Rule 41 by drawing on,
among other things, the unpublished proceedings of the Advisory Committee in the 1930s.
See Stephan B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1027, 1042-46 (2002). While there is some discussion of Rule 41(a), id. at 1042-43,
the bulk of that article concerns what the framers meant by the language in Rule 41 (b) over
what types of dismissals would be considered "upon the merits."
26. See Lipkin, supra note 11, at 985 ("the former equity practice has been codified").
This characterization is a stretch because the pre-1938 equity practice gave discretion to the
court, as opposed to imposing a bright-line rule.
27. The 1937 Advisory Committee Note, with respect to Rule 41(a), states in its en-
tirety as follows:
Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) ch. 110, § 176, and English Rules Under the Judicature
Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) 0. 26.
Provisions regarding dismissal in such statutes as U.S.C., Title 8, § 164 (Jurisdiction of
district courts in immigration cases) and U.S.C., Title 31, § 232 (Liability of persons
making false claims against United States; suits) are preserved by paragraph (1).
FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) Advisory Committee's Note.
The reference to the Illinois statute is curious because it was unlike Rule 4 1 (a) (1) (i), as it
permitted a voluntary dismissal before a "trial or hearing." For a discussion of the Illinois
statute as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules, see Car), S. Fleischer,
Comment, The Vanishing Right of the Plaintiff to Voluntarily Dismiss His Action, 9J. MAR.J. PRAC.
& PROC. 853, 855-56 (1976). The then Illinois provision is not dissimilar to the current pro-
vision. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009 (1993). "The Advisory Committee Notes that
accompanied the original Rules were often terse, and the Advisory Committee itself appar-
ently did not intend that they be given binding effect." Catherine T Struve, The Paradox of
Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1099, 1112 (2002)
(footnote omitted). Thus, one should not be too critical of the brevity of the Note in ques-
tion.
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From the language of the Rule itself, the drafters presumably de-
sired to limit the plaintiff's unilateral right to dismiss "to the early
stages of the proceedings, thus curbing the abuses of this right that
commonly had occurred under state procedures."28 While the
overall ethos of the rulemakers was to simplify arcane and techni-
cal procedural requirements, and hence "lower barriers to entry", 29
to the federal courts, the adoption of Rule 41 (a) (1) (i) is arguably a
partial counterexample to that trend in that it somewhat reflects
old procedural practice. Also, it probably reflects in part the lack
of uniformity among relevant state practices in the 1930s. The fed-
eral rulemakers were free to choose what they considered the most
optimal rule among several options.
Why was a modest voluntary dismissal option (different both
from the broad common law rule and from having no such option
at all) adopted? Perhaps the rulemakers, generally hostile to com-
mon law procedure, thought the common law rule excessively
formalistic and wasteful. On the other hand, perhaps they thought
it too radical of a change to abandon the common law rule en-
tirely. The window of opportunity they provided at the outset of
suit corresponded in some ways to other parts of Rule 41, which
state that dismissals for jurisdictional, venue, and Rule 19 reasons
would, unless otherwise stated, not be on the merits.3 ' Those suits
could be refiled again. A dismissal pursuant to a Rule 12(b) mo-
tion leads essentially to the same result.
28. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2363, at 253-54 (footnote omitted). This in-
ference is supported by some contemporary expressions by the rulemakers. See Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990):
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules, liberal state and federal procedural
rules often allowed dismissals or nonsuits as a matter of right until the entry of the
verdict, see, e.g., N.C. Code § 1-224(1943), orjudgment, see, e.g., La. Code Prac.Ann.,
Art. 491 (1942) .... Rule 41(a)(1) was designed to curb abuses of these nonsuit
rules. See 2 American Bar Association, Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules,
Cleveland, Ohio, 350 (1938) (Rule 41 (a) (1) was intended to eliminate "the annoying
of a defendant by being summoned into court in successive actions and then, if no
settlement is arrived at, requiring him to permit the action to be dismissed and an-
other one commenced at leisure") (remarks of judge George Donworth, member of
the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure)...
29. Resnik, supra note 25, at 935. For further discussion of the general intent of the
drafters of the Rules promulgated in 1938, see 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1004-05 (3d ed. 2002); Resnik, supra note
25, at 934-37.
30. See, supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). For a general discussion of the ethos of the drafters of the
1938 Rules, see Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Law-
suit Structure From the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1989).
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Rule 41(a)(1) has only undergone modest change since its in-
ception. The most significant amendment took place in 1948,
when language was added that cut off the right to dismiss unilater-
ally in the event that a motion for summary judgment was filed.
The drafters thought it was anomalous not to have a reference to a
summary judgment motion, when such a motion can be filed at
the same time as, or even before, an answer.2 Furthermore, federal
courts have for the most part not subjected Rule 41(a) (1) to con-
flicting interpretation. Read literally, Rule 41 (a) (1) (i) bestows an
unconditional right on the plaintiff to dismiss, as long as an answer
or a summary judgment motion has not been served. It does not
matter that considerable other activity has occurred, such as hear-
ings or rulings on injunctive relief, the filing of Rule 12 motions,
discovery, and the like. A few cases that have suggested that such
other activity might be a bar to the exercise of plaintiff's right have
been marginalized as precedent.
33
3. State Practice--Since their promulgation, the Federal Rules
have enjoyed success as a model for implementation by the states.
According to John Oakley's seminal article, 34 twenty-two states, plus
the District of Columbia, essentially replicate the Federal Rules
(with usually only minor exceptions), while another ten states
have, by rule or statute, substantially followed the federal model. 5
With regard to the plaintiffs right of voluntary dismissal, the fed-
eral model has been as successful. Thirty-seven states follow the
federal model, or something very close to it, curtailing though not
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) Advisory Committee's Note, reprinted in 5 F.R.D. 433, 465-66
(1948); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2363, at 254.
33. The leading case of this sort is Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203
F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953). That case involved a preliminary injunction hearing that lasted
several days. Thereafter the court refused to let the plaintiff voluntarily dismiss as of right,
reasoning that "a literal application of Rule 41 (a) 1 ... " to the present controversy would
not be in accord with its essential purpose of preventing arbitrary dismissals after an ad-
vanced stage of a suit has been reached." Id. at 108. A handful of other cases seem to have
made similar holdings. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2363, at 263-64. Most courts,
however, have expressly rejected Harvey, ruling that Rule 41 (a) (1) (i) must be read literally.
See, e.g., D.C. Electronics, Inc. v. Nartron Corp., 511 E2d 294 (6th Cir. 1975). See generally
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2363, at 264-65. While not expressly overruling Harvey,
later Second Circuit cases have "limited it to its facts." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16,
§ 2363, at 264 (footnote omitted); see also Santiago v. Victim Servs. Agency, 753 F.2d 219, 222
(2d Cir. 1985) (discussing these cases).
34. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367 (1986).
35. Id. at 1377-78. The study identified those jurisdictions that replicate the Federal
Rules by utilizing nine criteria, including whether the numbering and ordering of state rules
conform to the federal model, and the extent to which the state rules have replicated impor-
tant amendments to the Federal Rules. Id. at 1374-75.
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eliminating the common law prerogative. That leaves thirteen
states which do not follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41 (a) (1) (i).36
Much as state practice prior to 1938 differed, the same is true
for the thirteen states. Most permit dismissals up to the time the
trial starts, 7 or later.3 8 Ohio is an example of a departure from the
federal model. That state adopted its version of the Federal Rules
in 1970, but expressly declined to adopt the federal rule on volun-
tary dismissal. The reasons for this departure are hardly clear. The
official drafting history of Ohio rulemakers notes the difference
but offers no reasons for the departure .3 A later appellate court
decision written by a judge privy to the drafting observed that ini-
tially the federal rule was to be utilized.4 0 But it was objected that
the federal language would depart from what was described as
Ohio's tradition of encouraging voluntary dismissal, so the current
language, cutting off the right to dismissal when the trial com-41 • 41
mences, was substituted.
Cases interpreting this provision demonstrate that plaintiffs in
Ohio courts enjoy a dismissal right similar to the common law
privilege. For example, Ohio cases have held that the voluntary
dismissal option can be exercised even when the trial court has
rendered an adverse decision-but before the decision has been
36. The thirteen states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. The relevant
provisions of all of the states are found in an Appendix to this Article.
37. See, e.g,, 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/2-1009 (1993); OHio R. Civ. P. 41 (A)(1) (a).
38. See, e.g., ARK. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (allowing plaintiff to dismiss before final submission
of case to jury or judge); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-41 (1993) (allowing plaintiff to dismiss at
any time before plaintiff rests); Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.130 (1952) (allowing plaintiff to dis-
miss at any time before case is finally submitted to judge or jury); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-
601 (1) (1995) (same); N.C.R. Civ P. 41(a)(1)(i) (allowing plaintiff to dismiss at any time
before plaintiff rests); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 683 (2000) (allowing plaintiff to dismiss before
final submission of case to jury orjudge); WASH. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1)(B) (allowing plaintiff to
dismiss at any time before plaintiff rests at conclusion of his opening case).
39. OHIo R. Cirv. P. 41 staff note (1970).
40. Standard Oil Co. v. Grice, 345 N.E.2d 458, 460 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
41. OHIO R. Civ. P. 41 (A) (1) (a).
42. Grice, 345 N.E.2d at 460-61. The court observed:
Minutes of the meetings [concerning whether or not to adopt the federal rule] indi-
cate that objections to the federal rule were advanced. Refusal of the court on the day
of trial to grant a necessary continuance is the only example reported in the minutes
for the use of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Other examples resulting from
adverse decisions on preliminary matters were mentioned.
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journalized . The Rule has been read literally, so that any inquiry
into plaintiffs motives for dismissing, at the eleventh hour or oth-
erwise, and into hardships suffered by the defendant, is
inappropriate.44
B. Dismissal with Permission of the Court
If the plaintiff does not or cannot voluntarily dismiss unilaterally
or with the agreement of the defendant, her other option is to seek
the court's permission. Under Federal Rule 41 (a) (2), the court can
order a dismissal, "upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper."45 What the drafters had in mind is not clear, 6 but
43. Conley v. Jenkins, 602 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Grice, 345 N.E.2d
at 460-61. Under Ohio law, "[a] judgment is effective only when entered by the clerk upon
the journal." OHIO R. Civ. P. 58(A).
44. State ex reL Hunt v. Thompson, 586 N.E.2d 107 (Ohio 1992). Cf Denham v. New
Carlisle, 716 N.E.2d 184 (Ohio 1999) (voluntary dismissal may designate claims against less
than all of several named defendants). For further discussion of the application of the Ohio
rule, see 5 MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE, ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE § 168.02 (1994 & 2002
Supp.).
Two other aspects of Ohio practice are worth mentioning, one of which further expands
the plaintiffs option, while the other reduces the advantage to plaintiff. On the former, the
Ohio "savings statute", OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Anderson 2002), permits, under
certain circumstances, a case to be refiled for up to one year after it has been dismissed for
reasons unrelated to the merits. A plaintiff's dismissal under OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A) (1) (a)
has been held to be such a dismissal. SeeFrysinger v. Leech, 512 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio 1987). If
the dismissal took place before any statute of limitations ran, the additional year can extend
beyond the nominal running of the limitations period. See 4 STANLEY E. HARPER, JR. & MI-
CHAEL E. SOLIMINE, ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE § 148.13 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing
Ohio law). But see Parrish v. HBO & Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 792 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (Ohio savings
statute cannot be used when first suit was dismissed from federal court via Rule 41 (a) (1) (i),
and second suit was refiled in federal court). One source reports that thirty states other than
Ohio have savings statutes. WILLIAM D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING
STATUTES 2 & n.1 (1978) (listing states). Among those thirty states, however, there is a split
of authority on whether a savings statute applies to a voluntarily dismissed case. Id. at 287-
89.
On the latter, many of the Common Pleas courts (the trial court of general jurisdiction)
in Ohio have local rules which direct that if a case, previously dismissed by plaintiff in the
same court, is refiled, then it will be assigned to the judge assigned to the original case. See,
e.g., HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO, CT. COMMON PLEAS R. 7(J); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO,
CT. COMMON PLEAS R. 1.19, III.A.3.; FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO, CT. COMMON PLEAS R. 31.01.
Presumably these rules are intended to increase judicial efficiency, as the first judge should
already be familiar with the case, and may be able to ensure that matters undertaken in the
first round (e.g., discovery) can be applied to the second round.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 41 (a)(2)
46. Rule 41 (a) (2) was probably intended as a safety valve, given that the common law
practice was considerably restricted by Rule 41(a)(1)(i). Contemporary accounts do not
shed much light on the content of the factors found in the former. See, e.g., Cone v. W. Va.
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the purpose of the Rule has come to be considered to be "'primar-
ily to prevent voluntary dismissals which unfairly affect the other
side, and to permit the imposition of curative conditions.' ,47 This,
in turn, usually means that "dismissal should be allowed unless the
defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the
mere prospect of a second lawsuit."
48
Much of the case law focuses on the requisite degree of preju-
dice. To generalize, it is not unduly prejudicial if plaintiff obtains
"some tactical advantage" 49 due to the dismissal by, for example,
refiling suit under circumstances more favorable to the plaintiff,
but the details are important. Courts differ on whether dismissal is
appropriate when plaintiff wants to refile in a forum where a stat-
ute of limitations has not run50 or for other reasons. 5' Dismissal to
permit refiling in a forum that will apply different (and presumably
more favorable) substantive law has been disfavored,52 while dis-
missal has been permitted so that a plaintiff can obtain a jury
trial.53
Rather than focusing on one factor, most courts rely on a multi-
factor test. As one court recently summarized, "the analysis is con-
siderably more complex" than simply considering whether plaintiff
might file another lawsuit.5 4 Instead, the court continued:
Four factors should be examined to determine whether the
defendant would suffer plain legal prejudice if a case were
dismissed without prejudice: the defendant's effort and ex-
pense of preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of
Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947) (suggesting that the trial court might grant
dismissal, even during a trial, if the court were satisfied "that the ends ofjustice would best
be served by allowing [plaintiff] another chance."). Nonetheless, the grant of authority
found in Rule 41 (a)(2) is not surprising, given that the 1938 rulemakers valued trial judge
expertise and discretion. SeegeneraUy Bone, supra note 31, at 98-103.
47. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2364, at 279 (quoting Alamance Indus. Inc. v.
Filene's, 291 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1961)). See, e.g., Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314,
317 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra).
48. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2364, at 280 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., El-
baor, 279 F.3d at 317.
49. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2364, at 283.
50. Id. at 285 (summarizing cases). Compare McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855,
859 (11 th Cir. 1986) (loss of dispositive statute of limitations defense not a bar to uncondi-
tional Rule 41 (a) (2) dismissal) with Elhaor, 279 F.3d at 318 (holding to the contrary).
51. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2364, at 287-88 (discussing cases involving
removal from state court, where plaintiff desires to refile).
52. Id. at 298 (summarizing cases).
53. Id. at 285-86 (summarizing cases).
54. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., ATX, ATXII, and Wilderness Tires Products Li-
ability Litigation, 199 ER.D. 304, 306 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
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diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the ac-
tion, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal,
and the fact that a motion for summary judgment has been
filed by the defendant.
5
Other courts consider a similar list of factors.
56
Closely related to the issue of prejudice visited on the defendant
is what "terms and conditions," if any, ought to be attached to a
grant of dismissal. 7 Typically, and understandably, plaintiffs will
move for dismissal without mentioning any conditions. Then per-
haps aided by briefing by the defendant, the trial court will specify
conditions. The plaintiff can accept or reject the conditions; if the
plaintiff rejects, the dismissal request is withdrawn and the case
proceeds.58 The most common condition, it appears, is for the
court to order plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs incurred up to
that point.
59
Some courts have gone a step further, ordering that plaintiffs
pay the attorneys'fees incurred by defendant up to the point of dis-
missal.6° While the award of attorneys' fees in these circumstances
,61is said by some to be "commonplace," they are not automatic. Dis-
trict court judges enjoy discretion in awarding such fees. Indeed,
many courts appear to rely explicitly or implicitly on the same set
of factors that guides them in deciding whether to permit a volun-
55. Id. (quoting FDIC v. Knostman, 966 F.2d 1133, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992)).
56. For example, the Second Circuit has held that:
Voluntary dismissal without prejudice is thus not a matter of right. Factors relevant to
the consideration of a motion to dismiss without prejudice include the plaintiffs dili-
gence in bringing the motion; any "undue vexatiousness" on plaintiff's part; the
extent to which the suit has progressed, including the defendant's effort and expense
in preparation for trial; the duplicative expense of relitigation; and the adequacy of
plaintiffs explanation for the need to dismiss.
Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1989). For other cases, see WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 16, § 2364.4.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(2).
58. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2366, at 303.
59. Id. at 306-08.
60. Id. at 309-10.
61. In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 994 F.Supp. 638, 654 (D.V.I. 1998). See, e.g.,
Hinfin Realty Corp. v. Pittston Co., 206 ER.D. 350, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Where a plaintiff
successfully dismisses a suit without prejudice under Rule 41(a) (2), courts often grant the
defendant an award of costs or fees."). See also IDES & MAY, supra note 3, at 923 ("If the dis-
missal is to be without prejudice so that plaintiff can sue again, courts will often condition
the dismissal on plaintiff's agreeing to reimburse defendant for some or all of the costs and
attorney's fees incurred in litigating the first case.")
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tary dismissal in the first instance."2 Similarly, some courts find such
an award inappropriate if plaintiff is requesting a dismissal with
prejudice. If the primary purpose of conditions is to protect the
defendant, these courts argue, then less protection is necessary be-
cause a dismissal with prejudice will prevent plaintiff from suing
the defendant again. 4 Other conditions may be imposed in addi-
tion to or in lieu of costs or fees. For example, a court could order
that the "plaintiff produce documents or otherwise reduce the in-
convenience to the defendant, '' 65 or condition dismissal on the
parties' agreement to maintain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement
agreement.
66
Rule 41 contains one more provision relevant to the aforemen-
tioned provisions. Rule 41 (d) states that if a plaintiff refiles an
action, previously dismissed without prejudice, the court may order
that the costs of the previous action be paid to defendant.6v In
some ways this provision resembles Rule 41 (a) (2), especially re-
garding the condition of an award of costs. Here, though, there is a
circuit split over whether attorneys' fees can be awarded under
Rule 41(d), in addition to costs. Some courts argue that the pur-
pose of Rule 41 (d) is to discourage forum shopping by plaintiffs,
and, taken with the Rule's asserted parallelism to Rule 41 (a) (2),
68
attorneys' fees ought to be awardable. 8 Other courts observe that
Rule 41 (d), unlike Rule 41 (a) (2), explicitly refers to "costs," and
that suggests that attorneys'fees shouldn't be awardable. 69
62. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2366, at 311; In re Tutu Wells, 994 F.Supp. at
653.
63. AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[A] defendant may
not recover attorneys' fees when a plaintiff dismisses an action with prejudice absent excep-
tional circumstances.") (footnote omitted).
64. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2366, at 311-12; AeroTech, 110 F3d at 1527.
Even in these circumstances, the court might award attorneys' fees if "the case is of a kind in
which attorney's fees otherwise might be ordered after termination on the merits." WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 16, § 2366, at 311-12 (footnote omitted).
65. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2366, at 312 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 313-15. The Supreme Court held in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance
Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994) that federal courts do not automatically have jurisdic-
tion to enforce settlements formerly on their docket. Several exceptions to this rule were set
out, one of which was an agreement embodied in a dismissal under Rule 41 (a) (2).
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (d); see generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2375.
68. Behrle v. Olshansky, 139 ER.D. 370, 372-73 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
69. For an excellent summary of the dispute, with references to cases on both sides,
see Rogers v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 874-75 (6th Cir. 2000). See generally Edward
X. Clinton, Jr., Does Rule 41(d) Authorize an Award of Attorney's Fees?, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 81
(1997); Thomas Southard, Increasing the "Costs" of Nonsuit: A Proposed Clarifying Amendment to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 367 (2002).
There are several other aspects of Rule 41 and its state law counterparts that this Article
does not address in depth, as they are tangential to its principal focus. Thus, this Article
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C. Who Cares?
Before setting out our critique of the voluntary dismissal regime,
we pause to consider the significance of that regime in the day-to-
day life of civil litigation. The critique may carry less qualitative
force if, say, plaintiffs (relatively speaking) rarely seek to unilater-
ally dismiss under Rule 41 (a) (1) (i), or rarely seek court approval
under Rule 41 (a) (2). Unfortunately, there appears to be little hard
data that can be brought to bear on the use of Rule 41 (a). Official
statistics kept for the federal court keep track of dismissals in a ge-
neric fashion, and thus do not differentiate between or among
dismissals founded on Rules 12 or 41.'o Likewise, most states do not
keep close track of the numbers of dismissals in their courts under
their counterparts to Rule 41 (a) .71 As of the writing of this Article,
there are no empirical studies of the use of Rule 41 (a) .72
does not address Rule 41(c), concerning the dismissal of counterclaims, cross-claims, or
third-party claims. For a discussion of Rule 41(c), see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16,
§ 2365. Likewise, this Article does not address whether an adverse partial judgment can
become an appealable final judgment if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the remainder of
the claims without prejudice. For a discussion of this issue, see James v. Price Stern Sloan
Inc., 283 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2002); Rebecca A- Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by "Manu-
facturing" a FinalJudgment Through Voluntary Dismissal of Peripheral Claims, 48 MERCER L. REv.
979 (1997). Finally, this Article considers together both federal question and diversity cases.
While no doubt Rule 41(a) would apply in federal court in the former cases, it is perhaps
not so crystal clear that a differing state version of Rule 41 (a) would not apply in diversity.
To be sure, the conventional wisdom is that Rule 41 (a) would apply in diversity, see WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 16, § 2361, at 248 (referring to Rule 41 as a whole); see, e.g., Kahn v.
Sturgil, 66 F.R.D. 487,489-91 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (holding in a diversity action that Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41 (d) controlled over state law voluntary dismissal provision). It is perhaps not inconceiv-
able though that, under some circumstances, a state provision different from Federal Rule
41 (a) might control in diversity, given the complexity of the Erie doctrine. Cf Yarber v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 674 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1982) (in which a state saving statute, as part of a
state voluntary dismissal provision, was considered part of the statute of limitations and ap-
plicable in diversity). Extended discussion of the point is unnecessary here, as Rule 41 (a)
presumptively applies to all cases in federal court.
70. SeeJudith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL E 43, 46. More specifically,
the data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, published in its
Annual Report, and some of which is available on line, see Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M.
Clermont, Courts in Cyperspace, 46J. LEGAL EDUC. 94 (1996), does not break down statistics
on dismissals by type.
71. In Ohio, for example, an annual report containing much data on the filing and
termination of civil cases in Ohio trial courts does not indicate which dismissals were under
OHio R. CIv. P. 41(A)(1) or (2). See The 2000 Ohio Court Summary, available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/publications (last visitedJan. 6, 2003).
72. For example, an otherwise estimable empirical discussion of civil litigation in fed-
eral and state courts briefly discussed voluntary dismissal, but did not provide further data
on different types of such dismissals. Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in
the Gray, 70JUDICATURE 161, 163 (1986).
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But there is nonetheless some evidence that such dismissals are
sought or obtained with some frequency in both federal and state
courts. With regard to unilateral voluntary dismissals, attorneys re-
port that such dismissals are not uncommon, especially in a state
like Ohio with a plaintiff-friendly rule.73 A recent study of civil
rights actions filed in federal court indicated that up to twelve per-
cent of such cases were voluntarily dismissed (as opposed to other
types of terminations and dismissals) .4
Finally, this Article notes the failed effort to change the rule in
Ohio. In 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court proposed that Ohio
change its rule (which, as described above, says that the plaintiff
can dismiss up to the beginning of trial) to one that cuts off the
right of dismissal at "five days before the then-scheduled trial
date.,,75 The primary reason for the proposal was to preserve the
plaintiff's right, but limit the possibility of eleventh hour dismiss-
als.76 Dismissals on the literal eve of trial were thought to be
disruptive of a trial judge's management of her docket, and par-
ticularly prejudicial to the defendant's preparation for trial, much
of which typically takes place in the week before that event.77 So the
73. This concededly very anecdotal account is mirrored by other anecdotal accounts.
See, e.g., ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION 541 (5th ed.
2001) (noting that "voluntary dismissals are frequently sought," but citing no authority for
that proposition).
74. U.S. Department ofJustice, Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Civil Rights Complaints in
U.S. District Courts, 1990-98, tbl. 5, at 6 (2000) (between 1990 and 1998 voluntary dismiss-
als by plaintiffs ranged between 8.0% and 12.5%). The study does not appear to
differentiate between dismissals brought under Rule 41(a)(1)(i) or (a)(2). However, the
study clearly has separate data for cases that were "settled," id., which indicates that the data
cited does not include voluntary settlements reflected in dismissals under Rule 41 (a) (1) (ii).
75. See Proposed Staff Note to 1992 Amendment to Civ. R. 41, reprinted in Ohio State
Bar Association Report, Feb. 17, 1992, at lxxvi-lxxvii.
76. Id.
77. One federal judge commented on the proposal to amend Ohio Rule 41(a) as fol-
lows:
When Ohio adopted the Civil Rules in 1970, it compromised and moved the cut-off
time back to the commencement of trial. This timing gives plaintiffs a decided strate-
gic advantage in Ohio practice: since defendants have no corollary right, a plaintiff
can force a defendant to be fully prepared for trial without itself preparing and then
dismiss on the morning of trial if the case does not settle, thereby gaining at least an
additional year to prepare, because of [the Ohio savings statute] ....
That Ohio R. Civ. P. 41 (A)(1) grants plaintiffs a particular procedural right does not
mean that the right is grounded in fairness and justice. Under current federal prac-
tice in this and most district courts, parties agree on a comprehensive scheduling
order early in the case which requires timely disclosure of witnesses and trial prepara-
tion. Modification of a Rule 16 scheduling order requires some showing of good
cause, as indeed does a voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (2). There is no
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proposal was not, by a long shot, an adoption of the federal model.
Despite its apparently modest scope, the proposal was vociferously
opposed by the plaintiff's bar in Ohio.78 The opposition was so in-
tense that the Ohio Supreme Court eventually withdrew the
proposal, and it has not been resubmitted since then." A lesson
drawn from this story is that, in Ohio at least, the plaintiff bar often
uses, or contemplates the use of, unilateral voluntary dismissal.
The use of that dismissal option is of course not reflected in any
decision by a court, in either state or federal systems. In contrast, a
plaintiff's request for the court's permission to dismiss under Rule
41 (a) (2), and its state counterparts, will ostensibly generate a court
decision, granting or denying the request. While great caution
must be exercised in drawing conclusions based on published
fairness or justice in permitting a plaintiff unilaterally to tear up a scheduling order
and start over.
Naragon v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 934 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (footnotes
omitted).
78. Various plaintiffs attorneys argued
that the new rule would be much too restrictive because plaintiff's attorneys are
faced, in the last five days before trial, with "lying clients," expert witnesses with un-
foreseen emergencies, and other "unforseen [sic] matters which are beyond the
control of counsel." (2/20/92 letter by Paul Scott andJames Dennis on behalf of the
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers). Other arguments are that this new rule hurts only
the poor or is intended only to assist defendants. Another common theme is that
most cases dismissed under present Rule 41 (A) (1) are never refiled, but no empirical
evidence is cited.
Report of the Civil Rules Subcommittee, Re: Proposals Submitted by the Supreme Court in
January, 1992, at 2 (March 21, 1992) [hereinafter Subcommittee Report] (on file with au-
thors).
79. For a brief discussion of the rise and fall of this proposal, see Solimine, supra note
44, at 114-15. The first of the listed authors of the Article served as counsel (i.e., the re-
porter) to the Civil Rules Subcommittee of the Rules Advisory Committee of the Ohio
Supreme Court, and was involved in the drafting of the proposal. The discussion of the
proposal in this Article is that of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the
Rules Advisory Committee or of the Ohio Supreme Court.
A federal judge familiar with the rulemaking process described in the text observed:
The organized plaintiffs' bar is well aware of this strategic advantage and has de-
fended it vigorously: When the Ohio Supreme Court proposed in 1992 to move the
cut-off back to a mere five days before trial, the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers
threatened to use its considerable political power to have the General Assembly veto
the entire package of Rules proposals for that year unless the 41 (A) (1) amendment
were withdrawn.
Naragon, 934 ESupp. at 903.
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opinions,80 there are nonetheless scores of such opinions by federal
judges ruling on dismissal requests under Rule 41(a) (2) . While
no exact figure could be obtained, the lesson drawn is that, in fed-
eral courts at least, Rule 41(a) (2) dismissals are used, or sought to
be used, with some frequency.
Questions concerning the use of dismissals under Rule 41 (a)
would benefit from greater empirical study. In the absence of such
study, it is clear that significant numbers of cases in federal and
state courts are terminated by voluntary dismissals, either unilater-
ally or with the court's permission. In any event, whatever precise
statistics may show, any litigation takes place in the shadow of the
law. 2 Even if a plaintiff in a particular case never dismisses unilat-
erally or never seeks the court's permission to dismiss, the option is
still there. It may affect her strategy in filing suit in the first in-
stance, in litigating the case once filed, or while engaging in
settlement discussions. The actual and potential use of voluntary
dismissals, then, makes it a topic worthy of and ripe for reconsid-
eration.
III. THE PROBLEM
A. Why Have Voluntary Dismissals at All?
Strictly from the standpoint of the litigants, it seems incongru-
ous for a plaintiff to simply abandon her suit via a unilateral
80. A considerable literature discusses the possible shortcomings of relying on offi-
cially published opinions to study the workings of civil litigation. See, e.g., Susan M. Olson,
Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. Sys. J. 782
(1992); Peter Siegelman &JohnJ. Donohue, III, Studying the Icebergfrom Its Tip: A Comparison
of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & Soc'v REV. 1133 (1990).
This is not to say that empirical studies based on published opinions are useless. Such stud-
ies based on large numbers of published dispositions are surely reflective, to some degree, of
both judicial and litigant behavior. Moreover, published opinions are of course the principal
source of guidance to judges and attorneys in subsequent cases. See Michael E. Solimine, The
Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REv. 1, 39-41 (1998).
81. A Lexis search conducted in January 2003 indicated that federal courts, in opin-
ions found on that database, cited or discussed Rule 41(a) (2) well over 800 times since
January 1, 1990.
82. Cases will be settled before disposition on the merits, or not filed in the first in-
stance, depending in part on the existing procedural and substantive law that governs the
case. Those cases that are eventually decided by a judge or jury are often those where the
result is uncertain given the law, or more precisely where the litigants' predictions of the
likely result do not coincide. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). See generally Solimine, supra note 80, at 11-12, 44-
45 (discussing the Priest & Klein article and related literature).
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voluntary dismissal. If the plaintiff does that, why did she file suit in
the first instance? But as discussed above, there are a host of moti-
vations for the plaintiff to so act.8 3 Plaintiff may simply come to the
conclusion that she will not prevail, and wants to end the suit with-
out further expending time or money. 4 That conclusion may be
the result of changed circumstances, based on discovery, unfavor-
able court rulings, or other factors."5 In addition, the plaintiff may
wish to refile the suit in another forum, where a more favorable
outcome is more likely.s6 The plaintiff may have also initially filed
simultaneous litigation in multiple fora, and may eventually wish to
proceed in only one forum, while dismissing the rest."' The list of
reasons would seem to be as long as the reasons driving forum
shopping in the first instance.
Whatever the justifications used by modern plaintiffs, the exis-
tence of some voluntary dismissal is not entirely surprising as a
matter of historical practice. Civil procedure in the common law
era afforded plaintiffs considerably fewer advantages than those
enjoyed by plaintiffs today. For example, there were virtually no
opportunities to engage in discovery or to amend pleadings.8 The
pleadings themselves were governed by the rigid writ system. Of
course, these and other aspects of common law pleading could cut
against both sides in a suit. That said, perhaps it was the perception
that common law procedure disadvantaged plaintiffs more often
than defendants, coupled with the notion that plaintiffs were the
masters of their own lawsuits, that supported the existence of a
voluntary dismissal option.8s
83. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
84. MARCUS, supra note 3, at 204.
85. HAYDOCK, supra note 73, at 541.
86. R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 439 (3d ed.
2001); MARCUS, supra note 3, at 204. As one federal judge colorfully put it, a plaintiff in this
instance is "obviously heeding the words of Oliver Goldsmith:
For he who fights and runs away
May live to fight another day;
But he who is in battle slain
Can never rise to fight again."
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 581 F.2d 137, 144 (7th Cir. 1978) (Swygert, J., dissent-
ing).
87. HAYDOCK, supra note 73, at 541.
88. JAMES, supra note 3, at 273 (discussing amendment of pleadings at common law);
MARCUS, supra note 3, at 320 (discussing discovery at common law).
89. Explicit discussion of the point was not discovered in the literature researched for
this Article, but much of the discussion of common law procedure, as compared to modern
procedure, seems to at least implicitly suggest that it was typically plaintiffs who were more
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Modern civil procedure, of course, differs radically from its
common law ancestors. It differs in many ways that seem to consid-
erably undermine justifications for retaining a broad right of
voluntary dismissal. Pleading requirements have been relaxed and
discovery is available, both of which empower plaintiffs. Moreover,
the notion that plaintiffs are masters of their suit is no longer ten-
able in an era of managerial judging. For the past three decades, if
not longer, judges have abandoned their heretofore relatively pas-
sive roles in civil litigation, and aggressively managed discovery,
settlements, and many other aspects of a case, especially at various
pretrial stages.9 Some argue that much modern litigation is better
characterized as a series of transactions or negotiations among the
parties, counsel, and the court.9' The ability of a plaintiff to simply
abandon the suit in the midst of court management empowers the
plaintiff in a way that the court management model does not con-
92template. But one does not have to embrace that model, either as
normatively preferable, or as empirically reflective of what judges
do in most cases, to be wary of the voluntary dismissal option. Even
before the ascent of managerial judging, commentators were call-
ing for the abandonment or curtailment of voluntary dismissal9
In addition to the argument that voluntary dismissal is in con-
siderable tension with modern, adversarial, and often court-
managed litigation, a host of other reasons also argue against vol-
untary dismissals.
First, some of the reasons advanced by modern plaintiffs are to
us not always persuasive, as many are predictable or within the con-
trol of counsel. For example, unfavorable court rulings cannot be
completely unexpected. Other problems that truly are unexpected,
such as an important witness being unavailable at the last moment,
or an unexpected turn in the case calling for a new witness, could
be dealt with by asking the trial court for a continuance. Indeed, it
victimized by the former. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 3, at 21-22; MARCUS, supra note 3, at
121.
90. For discussions of managerial judging, see MARCUS, supra note 3, at 444-50; Rich-
ard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
761, 790-94 (1993). For a useful overview of managerial judging, together with a skeptical
assessment of its ability to constrain lawyers, see Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal
Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 1019-26 (1998).
91. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371
(2001).
92. See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy
and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Pi-r. L. REv. 809, 836-37 (1989).
93. See, e.g, Lipkin, supra note 11, at 987-88; Note, Absolute Dismissal Under Federal Rule
41(a): The Disappearing Right of Voluntary Nonsuit, 63 YALE L.J. 738, 742-43 (1954); Comment,
Federal Civil Procedure: Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(1), 1962 DUKE L.J. 285, 289-90.
Univerity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
would seem to be an abuse of discretion for a trial judge not to
grant a continuance in such a situation.
Second, a broad voluntary dismissal option can exacerbate
agency costs in civil litigation. Clients of course may have difficulty
in many settings in effectively monitoring their nominal agents-
their attorneys 4 But it is no less true for voluntary dismissals. Many
of the posited reasons for the existence of the option pertain to the
actions or inactions of the attorney, not of the plaintiff. Thus, the
attorney may be juggling several cases or otherwise be taking ac-
tions not necessarily advantageous to a particular client. A
voluntary dismissal may delay or complicate litigation of a case that
might, in some situations, dismay the plaintiff.95
Third, the use of voluntary dismissal is apt to be costly to the
defendant. Not knowing if or when the option will be used, the
defendant must respond to the complaint, engage in discovery, file
or respond to motions, and the like-costs that are wasted if the
plaintiff abandons the suit.96 Moreover, in many cases it would
94. There is a considerable literature on the problem of agency costs in civil litigation,
much of it focusing on class actions. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other
Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53,
56-58 (Spring/Summer 2001). The problem arises of course in the non-class action setting,
too. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987);
Thomas J. Miceli, Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 211
(1994).
95. Our research revealed no empirical evidence that might support or refute the as-
sertions made in this paragraph. Nor do we claim that plaintiffs habitually fail to monitor
their attorneys, with regard to Rule 41 motions or anything else. To the extent the problem
exists, it may be reflected in Rule 41 (a)(1) dismissals. Some suggestive evidence comes from
the debate in Ohio in 1991-1992 over amending the Ohio voluntary dismissal rule. See supra
notes 75-79 and accompanying text. One member of the Civil Rules Subcommittee ob-
served that sometimes motions for continuances of trial by local rule, for example FRANKLIN
COUNTY, OHIO, CT. COMMON PLEAS R. 45.01, need to be signed by both the attorney and
client, while Ohio Rule 41 (A) (1) dismissals need not be. It was suggested that the latter were
more prevalent than the former for that reason. Subcommittee Report, supra note 78, at 3.
The possible course of action by a plaintiffs attorney outlined in the text poses agency
costs, but is not necessarily, or always, injurious to the client. Many plaintiffs will enter into
contingency fee arrangements with attorneys, see Symposium: Contingency Fee Financing of
Litigation in America, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 227 (1998), and the client will typically not have to
pay out-of-pocket costs. Those will usually be absorbed by the attorney when she voluntarily
dismisses. Furthermore, the plaintiff only suffers delay if suit is refiled.
96. There might be no, or at least less, waste if the plaintiff refiles the suit after a vol-
untary dismissal. Presumably, then, the work done in the prior suit need not be totally
duplicated in the second suit. And some costs or even attorneys' fees might be recouped
under Rule 41 (d). Relatedly, even without implicating Rule 41 (d), ajudge could impose as a
condition on a dismissal without prejudice that the plaintiff pay any duplicative expenses in
the second case if it is refiled. Similarly, if dismissal was sought after, say, a summary judg-
ment motion was filed, a condition for refiling could be that the plaintiff agree to file a
response to the motion. (Thanks to Judge Walter Rice for these and other insights on Rule
41 practice.) But of course there is no guarantee that the suit will be refiled, or that there
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appear that defendants spend considerable time and energy in
preparing a case for trial, shortly before the trial starts. 97 That work
can be for naught, and will usually be duplicated, if a plaintiff is
permitted to voluntarily dismiss up to the eve of trial.
Fourth, the voluntary dismissal option can increase the costs to
the court in that the trial judge might spend time and effort man-
aging a case, ruling on motions, and the like-time that in effect is
wasted if the plaintiff dismisses. That time could have been devoted
to other cases. Similarly, the judge might expect a case to go to
trial, postponing trial of other cases set for the same week. That
plan can be disrupted if the case set for trial is abruptly dismissed
on the eve (say, the morning) of trial.98
Finally, law and economics literature suggests that the voluntary
dismissal option gives unusual advantages to the plaintiff. Much of
that literature focuses on the filing of lawsuits and the pursuit of
settlement by more-or-less rational maximizer litigants.99 The litera-
ture seeks to model and evaluate both litigation behavior and
procedural rules. Although there has been no discussion on this
won't be any duplication of effort by the defendant, even if there is a refiling. Furthermore,
the suit might be refiled in a different federal court, or in a state forum that doesn't follow
Rule 41 (d).
97. For some evidence supporting this point, see David M. Trubek, et al., The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 100-04 (1983). This Article acknowledges that the
voluntary dismissal option may not always be as prejudicial to defendants as we suggest in
the text. If for whatever reason a settlement cannot be achieved, the option permits the
plaintiff to quickly dismiss a case, perhaps to the relief of the defendant. The relief may be
well-founded if the suit is weak and unlikely to be refiled, which is the functional equivalent
of a settlement or of a dismissal with prejudice. Another example, suggested to us by an
attorney, is that the option permits the plaintiffs attorney to dismiss, leaving open the possi-
bility, however remote, of refiling suit. That possibility might forestall a malpractice claim by
unhappy clients. Absent that possibility, plaintiff's counsel might feel obliged to grind on
with the suit.
98. See, e.g., Naragon v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 934 F. Supp. 899, 902 (S.D. Ohio
1996) (which, in discussing why Rule 41 (a) dismissal was inappropriate, observes that "this
Court and the parties have already invested substantial time in preparing this case for trial.")
As acknowledged in Part II.C., empirical evidence of the use or effect of the voluntary dis-
missal option is relatively scarce. For that reason, no firm evidence is cited to support the
analysis in this paragraph. But it is supported by anecdotal evidence, gained from conversa-
tions with Ohio lawyers and judges. The disruption to the court's docket was also referenced
by the proponents of the failed proposal in 1991-1992 to change Ohio's rule. See, supra note
77 & accompanying text. Any overstatement of the waste point from the court's perspective
is unintended. Court rulings on motions, especially if they are reflected in accessible opin-
ions, are public goods and may provide useful precedent in other cases. See United States
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) (making this point with
respect to case that had settled).
99. For overviews, see generally ROBERT C. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: ECONOMICS OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 21 (5th ed.
1998).
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point other than passing references 00 to the voluntary dismissal
option, that literature can be drawn upon, inasmuch as it addresses
information asymmetry between the parties. ' In that regard, a
voluntary dismissal option, especially one broadly defined, in effect
creates an informed plaintiff and uninformed defendant-the lat-
ter because defendant does not know if, or when, plaintiff will use
the option. The informed plaintiff model suggests that plaintiffs
will try to take advantage of defendants' ignorance in various
102
ways.
In our situation, the model predicts that, for example, the de-
fendant may be apt to settle, not wanting to pour resources into a
case that the plaintiff may abruptly dismiss. A defendant might re-
fuse to settle to thwart such a strategy. Much will depend on how
likely each party believes the other side will pursue the alternative
strategies.1 3 Likewise, much will depend on how costly this strategy
is to the plaintiff, for it seems that the voluntary dismissal option is
not "cost-free"104 to plaintiff. As a plaintiff ponders when and if to
use the option, presumably she too must expend time and money
(in discovery, for example) to prepare the case for trial. Then
again, a plaintiff can delay some such costs (such as those associ-
ated with the final preparation for trial), secure in the knowledge
that she can dismiss if the defendant does not advance an accept-
able settlement figure.'0 5
100. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 538, 544,
548, 551, 574 (1997) (briefly referring to plaintiff "dropping" a suit as one of several op-
tions).
101. Much of the literature critiquing the Priest & Klein selection thesis, supra note 82,
focuses on the effect of various informational asymmetries between the parties.
102. Bone, supra note 100, at 542-50.
103. Id. at 545.
104. Id. at 539 n.73 (discussing "cost-free" stages of litigation, where "the plaintiff can
force the defendant to invest without having to invest himself"). While this Article draws on
the literature, as exemplified by Bone's article, it does not engage in all of the methodologi-
cal rigor found in that article and others.
105. Naragon, 934 F Supp. at 903. The court added:
During 1991 testimony on a proposal to adopt Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) in place of the
present Ohio rule, the Ohio Supreme Court's Rule Advisory Committee heard from a
Common Pleas judge that a prominent Toledo plaintiffs' medical malpractice firm
had never gone to trial in his court on the first-set trial date; in the absence of settle-
ment they had always dismissed on the morning of trial.
Id. at 903 n.8.
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B. The Judicial Role in Conditioning Plaintiff's Dismissal
As previously discussed, courts utilize a long list of factors in de-
termining whether, and under what conditions, to grant a
plaintiffs request to voluntarily dismiss a case.10 6 Much of that in-
quiry focuses on the prejudice that may be visited on the
defendant by permitting a dismissal. The inquiry will be highly
contextual and fact-specific. As one court succinctly put it:
Although the courts talk about "legal prejudice," the govern-
ing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure lays down no specific test,
and the precedents could be read as saying that everything
depends on the particular circumstances and that a range of
factors could be taken into account.107
In other words, courts are utilizing a balancing test, a standard,
not a bright-line rule. To put the distinction simply, a legal princi-
ple that is characterized as a standard is broad and vague and
requires the decision maker to ponder and weigh the facts to reach
a result. Rules, by contrast, are narrow and precise, and in theory
yield an answer quickly and easily once applied to the facts of a
108
case.
The purpose of this Article is not to enter the normative
jurisprudential debate between rules and standards. To be sure,
simply labeling a legal principle as a standard (or a rule, for that
matter) is hardly dispositive. Standards are legion in civil
procedure" and of course in other areas of law. Rather, the focus is
on the content of the standard. Two aspects of the standard typically
used by courts to gauge motions under Rule 41(a) (2) are
particularly problematic. First, some of the criteria seem to call for
106. See, supra Part II. B.
107. Doe v. Urohealth Sys., Inc., 216 F3d 157, 163 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
One writer three decades ago aptly characterized the application of the multiple-factor test
under Rule 41 (a) (2) as a "laborious balancing process." Lawrence Mentz, Note, Voluntary
Dismissal by Order of Court - Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) and Judicial Discretion, 48
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 446, 459 (1972). The characterization is no less true today.
108. For general discussions of rules and standards, see Posner, supra note 99, at 592-95;
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 121-35 (1996); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 62-69 (1992).
109. As just one example, consider the Supreme Court's multi-factor approach to de-
termining whether a forum state has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
Solimine, supra note 80, at 42 (discussing how that approach is best characterized as a stan-
dard).
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an examination of the motivations of plaintiffs attorney-for
example, the reasons for the need to take a dismissal."' This
borders on a subjective inquiry that is not easy to document or
determine under any circumstances.'
In addition, it is a determination that courts are understandably
reluctant to make. Consider one, not atypical recent case. In
Pontenberg v. Boston Scientic C"orp., 11 2 plaintiff filed a products
liability action. For over seven months, the parties engaged in
discovery, under the aegis of a case management and scheduling
order. Eventually, the district court upon motion struck plaintiff's
list of expert witnesses, and defendant moved for summary
judgment. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion, and insteadS • 113
moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Defendant
opposed the motion, in part because it
claimed that a dismissal without prejudice was inappropriate
at this juncture in the litigation because it had invested con-
siderable resources, financial and otherwise, in defending the
action, including by preparing the then pending summary
judgment motion. 14
In addition, defendant asserted that plaintiff had not diligently
prosecuted the action."' The court rejected these arguments and
110. See, supra note 55 & accompanying text. See, e.g,, Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc.,
279 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 2002) (In deciding whether to grant or deny a Rule 41(a)(2)
dismissal, " 'a court should consider factors such as whether the party has presented a
proper explanation for its desire to dismiss....'" (quoting Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharm., Inc., 187 E3d 941, 950 (8th Cir. 1999))).
The Supreme Court recently reiterated the point in an analogous setting. In Lapides v.
Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613(2002), the Court unanimously
held that a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state
to federal court. In arguing that there was no waiver, the state contended, among other
things, that "its motive for removal was benign," id. at 621, in that it was meant to protect the
interests of co-defendants. But the Court was unpersuaded: "A benign motive, however,
cannot make the critical difference for which [the state] hopes. Motives are difficult to
evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be clear." 1d.
111. This problem has been recognized and responded to in other areas of civil proce-
dure. For example, Rule 11 was amended in part in 1983 largely to eliminate the focus on a
purely subjective inquiry. See MARCUS, supra note 3, at 139. Rule 11, as further amended in
1993, mainly focuses on a reasonableness test, but still has a provision that in certain circum-
stances calls for the court to analyze whether actions were taken "for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tionf.]" FED. R. Cxv. P. I I(b) (1).
112. 252 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
113. Id. at 1255.
114. Id. at 1256.
115. Id.
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granted the motion.1 1 6 On the diligence point, defendant empha-
sized that plaintiff apparently failed to engage in any discovery,
failed to properly disclose expert witnesses, and only moved for a
voluntary dismissal after the summary judgment motion was
filed. "' The Eleventh Circuit did not discuss these points in detail,
instead mentioning briefly that there was evidence in the record
that Plaintiff's counsel had not acted in "bad faith," and that the
failure to properly exchange expert witness lists was due to "inac-
tion" rather than "design.""11 Pontenberg was not necessarily wrongly
decided. The case illustrates that it is difficult, even on arguably
compelling facts, to demonstrate bad faith by an attorney. Indeed,
it appears that it is quite rare for a court to make such a finding in
the context of a Rule 41 (a) (2) motion.' The practical utility of
that factor, then, seems comparatively little.
The second criticism of the criteria typically used in Rule
41 (a) (2) motions focuses on forum shopping. Recall that courts in
general frown upon plaintiffs seeking dismissal to be able to file
suit in a different, more favorable forum.' 20 This discomfort is
misplaced. Forum shopping is a ubiquitous phenomenon in
American civil litigation. Plaintiffs shop for favorable fora for a
long list of reasons, including cost, convenience, sympathetic
judges and juries, procedural differences, different applicable law,
and others. 121 Similarly, defendants can attempt to forum shop for
116. The grant was made with the caveat that costs should be assessed against plaintiff
under Rule 41 (d) should she refile the suit. Id.
117. Id. at 1257.
118. Id. at 1257-58. The appellate court observed that while the lower court had struck
plaintiff's list of experts as inadequate, at a hearing it had not concluded that plaintiff's
counsel "had been dilatory or acted in bad faith." Id. at 1257 n.3. The district court stated
that plaintiffs failure was not a "tactical decision," but was due to "inaction." Id. at 1258 n.3.
At the hearing, plaintiffs counsel explained that "both she and her client were having diffi-
culty financially affording expert witnesses," and that "she had been involved in a race for
office in the state legislature... and had not properly attended to the case." Id. at 1257 n.3.
119. Research for this Article failed to uncover a published case where the court
squarely held that a plaintiff was acting in bad faith in seeking a voluntary dismissal. There
probably are such cases, but surely the number is not large, or it would be reflected in pub-
lished opinions.
120. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
121. For overviews of forum shopping focusing mostly on the plaintiff's perspective, see
ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION §§ 2.01-2.28 (2d ed. 1999); Mary
Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L.
REv. 79 (1999); Gita F. Rothschild, Forum Shopping, 24 LITIG. 40 (Spring 1998); Antony L.
Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167 (2000); Solimine, supra note 80, at
18-19.
Most of the literature discusses forum shopping in the abstract or relies on mostly anec-
dotal accounts. There has been some empirical work, principally surveys of attorneys. For an
overview of that work by a contributor to it, see Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice Between State
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similar reasons by, for example, seeking dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds, or by removing a case from state to federal court.1 22 It
thus seems odd to sanction a plaintiff for doing what comes
naturally. Indeed, the very existence of a voluntary dismissal option
is itself a potential avenue of forum shopping, no matter what the
ostensible reasons. Even if a plaintiff refiles in the same court, she
may draw a different judge, or otherwise litigate the case under
circumstances more favorable to her. So, efforts to avoid rewarding
forum shopping in this context are misguided as well.
1 23
The Rule 41 (a) (2) factors are complex because the list of factors
is long, and a court is not obliged to address or apply each one.
24
Furthermore, even if the court grants the motion, the court must
decide if the dismissal is with or without prejudice and what
conditions if any must attach to the dismissal. There ought to be a
better and easier way.
and Federal Courts, 46 S.C. L. REv. 961 (1995). See also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 119, 121-29 (2002).
122. For discussions of forum shopping focusing on the defendant's perspective, see
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL
L. REv. 1507 (1995); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369 (1992); Solimine, supra note
80, at 20.
123. The explicit or implicit hostility to forum shopping in the Rule 41(a)(2) context,
or other contexts, probably derives from long-standing notions that such shopping under-
mines ideals of having even-handed, uniform justice meted out, no matter what the forum.
For useful discussion of the point, see George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping--
Why Doesn't a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649, 666-68 (1993); Note,
Forum-ShoppingReconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (1990).
This is not to say that especially blatant forms of forum-shopping are not, or should not
be curtailed. Thus, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) places limits on the manipulation
of joinder of parties to achieve diversity jurisdiction. More generally, the existence of a
minimum contacts hurdle places limits on where plaintiffs can sue out-of-state defendants.
The unavoidable existence of forum shopping in the United States can be acknowledged
without necessarily abandoning all efforts to regulate those forms of shopping that seem
particularly egregious or unfair. That said, the use of Rule 41 (a) (2) litigation to monitor
forum shopping on a case by case basis is not a particularly efficient example of such regula-
tion. Put another way, allowing a plaintiff to choose one of several available fora as an initial
matter is not particularly objectionable, but allowing a plaintiff to litigate and then dismiss,
perhaps refiling later in a different court, may be problematic. The latter actions raise dif-
ferent fairness and efficiency concerns beyond that of simple forum shopping.
124. Doe v. Urohealth Sys., Inc., 216 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[C]ourts need not
analyze each factor or limit their consideration to these factors.").
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IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM
A. The Optimal Scope of the Plaintiff's Right to Voluntarily Dismiss
The previous Part questioned the wisdom of a unilateral volun-
tary dismissal option, and further questioned the factors courts use
when considering whether to grant permission to so dismiss. This
Part suggests alternatives to the present regime on each score.
There is, in theory, a dizzying array of potential reforms. The
voluntary dismissal option could simply be abolished (though even
then, some form of Rule 41 (a) (2) type motion would need to exist,
lest unwilling plaintiffs be forced to litigate). 5 Or, akin to the cur-
rent federal rule, plaintiffs could be permitted a small window of
opportunity to unilaterally dismiss at the beginning of the case.
After that, plaintiffs would need the court's permission absent
agreement of the defendant. Or, akin to the common law pleading
rule, still in place in several states, the plaintiff could have a very
wide window of opportunity to dismiss, up to or even beyond the
beginning of a trial. Under that option, a Rule 41 (a) (2) type mo-
tion could still be available, though it would seem to be less
necessary. To add to the complexity, reformers would need to con-
sider whether the unilateral voluntary dismissal option, when
provided, is with or without prejudice. To make matters more
complicated still, reformers would also need to take into account
how courts should exercise their authority under Rule 41 (a) (2).
That is, for example, if courts only grant such motions with oner-
ous conditions, this should affect the scope of any unilateral right
afforded the plaintiff.
The best option is to choose the middle path and permit the
plaintiff a small window of opportunity at the beginning of the case
to voluntarily dismiss once without prejudice. The window should
close when defendant formally responds to the suit, by way of mo-
tion or answer. Thereafter, the plaintiff would need the court's
permission-a matter addressed below. This proposal, then, is very
similar, but not identical to, current Federal Rule 41.126
125. Of course, plaintiffs can always settle with defendants under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), but
we are assuming that no such settlement can be worked out. If it could, plaintiffs would not
need to utilize a unilateral dismissal. On the other hand, presumably a plaintiff could simply
stop litigating and be subject to dismissal for want of prosecution under Rule 41 (b).
126. It is not identical to the current federal rule, which closes the window only when
the defendant files an answer or moves for summaryjudgment. What goes unmentioned is a
very common response by a defendant, namely a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. It is not
clear why the original drafters left that out. It is thus included in our discussion, coupled
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Why not eliminate all unilateral dismissals, and require all dis-
missals to be routed through Rule 41(a) (2) motions? This
approach is too draconian. The primary justification for limiting
voluntary dismissals is to lessen prejudice to the defendant and to
the court system itself.12 7 Both types of prejudice are apt to be rela-
tively little at the very beginning of a case before defendant
answers. It is doubtful that the trial judge will have spent any time
toiling on the case. Likewise, the defendant in most instances will
not have devoted much time or money preparing a defense early
on. There will be a few exceptions to these generalizations. For ex-
ample, there might be considerable activity by the parties and the
court during a preliminary injunction hearing-very early on in
the case. Then the plaintiff might drop the case if the court refuses
to grant an injunction.2 2 But the defendant, if he desires, can easily
protect himself by filing an answer during this process.129
with the recognition that the rulemakers have not seen fit to adopt it, even though Rule 41
has been amended several times in other respects. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16,
§ 2363, at 261-62 & n.19.
Bob Bone has suggested a reason for not permitting the filing of a Rule 12 motion to cut
off the voluntary dismissal option. A modest option should be available, in part to counter-
act information advantages that defendant may possess. See infta notes 134-35 and
accompanying text. Indeed, a defendant would seem to have an incentive to reveal informa-
tion voluntarily to the plaintiff that demonstrates the weakness of the claim. In lieu of that,
the plaintiff might also learn about the defects in her case from the defendant filing a Rule
12 motion. The formal motion may lend credibility to the defendant's assertions that the
case is weak. These arguments are not without force, but they are not conclusive against the
proposed reform. Having parties voluntarily exchange information before, during, or after
the filing of a Rule 12 motion is not objectionable, but extending the plaintiff's option to
dismiss beyond a very early stage gives the plaintiff too many options. The Rule 12 motion,
and accompanying memorandum, can indeed convey useful information to the plaintiff,
which may convince her (or her counsel) to abandon the suit. The same is true, however, of
other actions by the defendant, such as the filing of a summary judgment motion or the
making of opening statements at trial. If the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal option is ex-
tended to encompass all of these points, then the common law standard would effectively be
reinstated. A Rule 12 motion, unlike these other actions, is almost always made early on in
this case.
127. See supra Part III.A. Some authorities suggest that "'prejudice to the opposing
party, rather than the convenience of the court,'" is the primary or exclusive factor for a
court to consider in ruling upon a Rule 41 (a) (2) motion. County of Santa Fe v. Pub. Serv.
Co. of N. M., 311 E3d 1031, 1047 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Clark v. Tansy, 13 E3d 1407,
1411 (10th Cir. 1993) (alterations omitted) (quoting 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2364, at 161 (1971))). This would appear
to be in some tension with our view, and those of others, that both factors are relevant for a
court to consider. Regardless, the proposed reform focuses primarily on the prejudice to the
opposing party by reimbursing the defendant for the costs and fees incurred before the
dismissal is granted (if it is granted).
128. This is apparently a not uncommon occurrence, as it is reflected in the fact pat-
terns of some cases that read Rule 41 (a) (1) non-literally. See supra note 33.
129. See D.C. Electronics, Inc. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 1975) (in-
volving same fact pattern as described in text).
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For a variety of reasons, a plaintiff may simply change her mind
shortly after filing suit, and may wish to abandon the suit. Given
the lessened or nonexistent prejudice, it seems unnecessary to en-
gage the Rule 41(a) (2) process if the dismissal is early. The
solution is not perfect; it can be underinclusive or overinclusive.
Some very early dismissals can be prejudicial; some later dismissals,
when Rule 41 (a) (2) comes into effect, will generate little preju-
dice. But those instances are presumably marginal, and on balance
not worth adjudicating under an expanded Rule 41 (a) (2).
For the reasons outlined earlier in this Article,'3" expanded vol-
untary dismissal options create excessive prejudice. Yet in light of
our earlier comments, it is perhaps surprising that this Article en-
dorses even a modest role for unilateral voluntary dismissal.
Although it preserves an option available to the plaintiff and not to
the defendant, "[t] he existence of an option afforded plaintiff and
denied defendant.., is a commonly accepted litigation phenome-
non." 3' Although parties should, generally speaking, be on equal
footing when it comes to procedure, 132 modest exceptions to the
general rule, like the one we suggest, can do more good than
harm.
33
Informational asymmetries often operate in favor of defendants, 3
4
but such asymmetries do not necessarily characterize all or most
civil litigation. 35 That sort of generalization sweeps far too wide,
130. See, supra Part III A.
131. Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of
the Apprupiate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REv. 356, 375 (1977). For some examples in both direc-
tions, consider the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the Rule 68 offer ofjudgment, which only
defendants can use, and one-way attorney-fee shifting statutes, which almost always operate
in favor of plaintiffs.
132. See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CAR-
Dozo L. REv. 1865 (2002).
133. Cf RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 860 (5th ed. 2003):
Isn't the underlying difficulty that litigants do not come labeled as "plaintiffs" and
"defendants" as a matter of preexisting Platonic reality? Whether one is a plaintiff or
a defendant (when is the law a sword? when a shield?) is itself contingent, a product
of our remedial and substantive rules.
134. See Bone, supra note 100, at 550-58; Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-Information
Model of Litigation, 22 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 153 (2002).
135. Some writers emphasize that defendants who are repeat players in litigation may
have strategic incentives, not enjoyed by one-shot plaintiffs, to aggressively defend cases
beyond that which might be thought rational or, conversely, to quickly settle cases that one
might think would not easily settle. The effect may or may not favor a particular plaintiff,
depending on the circumstances of a case, but either way it may hamper the development of
law by warping the diet of cases that are actually adjudicated on the merits. See Catherine
WINTER 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
but it does suggest that a modest voluntary dismissal option is a way
to correct for those asymmetries. Again, the point cuts bluntly. Ide-
ally, the proposed reform could provide an option for those bodies
of law or litigation where asymmetry in favor of the defendant is
especially pronounced, but micromanagement of Rule 41 is ineffi-
cient.
B. Awarding Attorneys'Fees as the Sole Condition
Courts undertake to review a long list of factors when consider-
ing a motion to voluntarily dismiss under Rule 41(a) (2) .136 The
complexity of these factors and at least some of their content is
criticized in this Article. 137 The proposed reform makes resolution
of Rule 41 (a) (2) motions both simpler and more coherent: courts
should automatically grant the motion, permitting the suit to be
dismissed without prejudice, upon payment to a requesting defen-
dant of a reasonable amount of costs and attorneys'fees incurred
up to that point in the litigation.138
Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 869 (1999); Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2000).
136. See supra Part II.B.
137. See, supra Part III B.
138. Caveats to our proposed reform would include that, if the case had previously been
dismissed and refiled, the dismissal should normally be with prejudice, which tracks the last
sentence of Rule 41 (a) (1). Likewise, if in an initial dismissal the plaintiff seeks it with preju-
dice, normally that should be granted as well. See Century Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Transp. Int'l,
Inc., 209 F.R.D. 647, 648 (D. Mass. 2002) ("[I]t is difficult, both practically and logistically, to
image [sic] a court denying a plaintiff's motion to dismiss her own action with prejudice.")
(quoting Shepard v. Egan, 767 ESupp. 1158, 1165 (D. Mass. 1990)). But cf County of Santa
Fe v. Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 311 F.3d 1031, 1049 (10th Cir. 2002) (declining to adopt an
automatic rule that a court must grant a Rule 41 (a) (2) motion when dismissal with preju-
dice may adversely affect the defendant or, more likely, other parties to the litigation.). In
that circumstance, there should not be an automatic award of attorneys' fees to the defen-
dant. The reason is that a dismissal with prejudice is normally a complete surrender by the
plaintiff and, absent the application of a rare statute that shifts fees in favor of a prevailing
defendant, see infra note 147, a defendant who prevails at trial or otherwise on the merits
does not recover fees. Awarding fees would be a disincentive for the plaintiff to dismiss with
prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice can be a complete surrender if it is extremely
unlikely that plaintiff will refile that particular suit. But that possibility is always there. How
often such refilings take place is an important question on which there is no available data,
and which would benefit from further study. (Thanks to Judge Michael Merz for his insights
on this point.)
Courts should award reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, and not simply blindly award the
amount requested by the defendant. Defendant should be required to document both
amounts. Courts can and do draw on the case law interpreting FED. R. CTr. P. 54(d) and 28
U.S.C. § 1920 with respect to costs, and on the case law interpreting fee-shifting statutes, see
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The advantages of this model are straightforward: courts would
no longer need to engage in a balancing of factors. Plaintiffs would
not need to explain or justify their course of action. The real
prejudice visited upon defendants-the money they expended in
responding to the suit and preparing for trial-would be compen-
sated. Currently, courts ponder whether a potentially refiled suit by
plaintiff will be "legally" (as opposed to "merely") prejudicial to the
defendant. Courts differ on this issue. The issue is largely meta-
physical: anything a plaintiff does subsequently will prejudice the
defendant to some degree. Rather than parsing out levels of ac-
ceptable or unacceptable prejudice, prejudice is simply presumed
and defendants are thereby compensated.
At first blush, this proposed reform might seem quite
problematic, for it in effect adopts a form of the English Rule on
attorneys' fees. That rule requires the losing party to pay the
winning party's attorneys'fees.14 In contrast, the American Rule
requires that, absent exception, each side pays its own
attorneys'fees, no matter who wins, or if the case settles.14' Debate
between the proponents of these respective rules has been
extremely controversial, to put it mildly. Proponents of the English
Rule argue that it properly reimburses a winning party for all of its
costs and discourages the bringing of non-meritorious claims.
142
Proponents of the American Rule argue that it encourages socially
desirable conduct or, put another way, that the English Rule deters
the filing of both meritless and meritorious suits. 43 The arguments
have been the subject of an enormous contested literature'" and
10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2675.1 (1998),
with respect to fees. See, e.g., Hinfin Realty Corp. v. Pittston Co., 206 ER.D. 350, 358
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (After plaintiff was granted a Rule 41(a) (2) dismissal without prejudice,
defendant was required to renew request for attorneys' fees and costs with proper documen-
tation through billing time sheets or affidavits; the court "will reduce the defendant's fee
application by the amount of work the defendant will be able to use in a subsequent litiga-
tion."); Mercer Tool Corp. v. Friedr. Dick GmbH, 179 F.R.D. 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (carefully
evaluating and reducing defendant's request for attorneys' fees in context of Rule 41 (a) (2)
dismissal); Robertson v. McCloskey, 121 F.R.D. 131 (D.D.C. 1988) (evaluating and reducing
defendant's request for costs in context of Rule 41 (a) (2) dismissal).
139. See supra notes 49-55, 107 and accompanying text.
140. JAMES, supra note 3, at 50.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. For a useful overview of the respective Rules and the debate between their propo-
nents, see id. at 49-51.
144. For a sampling of the literature, see Posner, supra note 99, at 624-32; Keith N. Hyl-
ton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1993); Harold J.
Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039 (1993); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., In-
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the object of some, albeit inconclusive, empirical study.' 45 Despite
the controversy, in the United States, "the American Rule is well
entrenched"'' 46 subject to various statutory exceptions at the federal
and state levels that usually operate in favor of the prevailing
plaintiff only. 1
47
It is unnecessary to enter or extend this debate, as the proposed
reform avoids much of the controversy. This is because the opera-
tion of the proposed rule is in the hands of the plaintiff. Should
the plaintiff not desire any award of fees to the defendant, she can
dismiss during the initial window of opportunity. Even after that
window closes, the plaintiff is still empowered to determine the
amount of an award. The plaintiff alone determines when she will
move to dismiss under Rule 41 (a) (2), and thus cut off the accumu-
lation of a fee award payable to the defendant. Contrast this to the
usual operation of fee-shifting statutes, which of course usually de-
pend on the resolution by the court of who is the prevailing party.
demnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-
Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317 (1998).
145. For a sampling of the empirical literature, see James H. Hughes & Edward A. Sny-
der, Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38J. L.
& ECON. 225 (1995); Brian G.M. Main & Andrew Park, The British and American Rules: An
Experimental Examination of Pre-Trial Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 47 ScorrisH J. POL.
ECON. 37 (2000); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage
Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 519 (1998). For an overview of the
literature, see James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Allocation of Litigation Costs: American
and English Rules, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 51-56
(Peter Newman ed., 1998); Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation:
What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1943, 1948-60 (2002).
146. JAMES, supra note 3, at 50.
147. Id. at 51-52. At the federal level, Congress has passed scores of fee-shifting statutes,
see Krent, supra note 144, at 2041-42, most of which, expressly or byjudicial interpretation,
are "one-way" in that they only award fees to a prevailing plaintiff, not a prevailing defen-
dant. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (applying interpretative rule that fee-
shifting statutes are presumed unless otherwise stated to be one-way in favor of prevailing
plaintiff).
A further exception to the American Rule permits a prevailing defendant to recover if the
plaintiff's suit was frivolous. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). This
exception will usually not be of much aid to defendants responding to a Rule 41 (a) (2) mo-
tion, as courts have held that a plaintiff merely dismissing under that rule, in and of itself,
does not establish that plaintiffs action was frivolous. E.g., Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505 (5th
Cir. 2001) (refusing to award fees). Moreover, use of this exception by defendants in this
context could face an even more serious problem under the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598(2001), which held that under fee-shifting statutes, a "prevailing
party" was not merely someone whose suit was a "catalyst" to achieving a desired result, but
rather one who secured a judgment on the merits or through a consent decree or settle-
ment. Id. at 600, 610. A defendant in the Rule 41(a) (2) context would not seem to fall into
the latter categories.
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It bears repeating that under the proposed reform, the plaintiff is
free to refile the suit.'
48
Our proposed reform has the further advantage of largely codi-
fying prevailing practice, or at least existing doctrine. As previously
discussed, 149 courts will often eschew, explicitly or implicitly, an ap-
plication of a complex array of factors, and simply award
reasonable costs and fees to the defendant as the condition. Per-
haps that trend is revealing, as it suggests judicial inclination
toward a "rule" approach to Rule 41 (a) (2) motions. 150 But whatever
the reasons, the inclination should be made explicit and control-
ling.1
51
148. In the refiled suit, a plaintiff could presumably recoup such a payment if she ob-
tains an award of attorneys' fees, by way of prevailing on the merits, or by a settlement,
assuming there is an exception to the American Rule available in that suit.
149. See, supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
150. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Proce-
dure, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 631 (1994) (stating that, in interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, "we would expect judges to opt for those procedural rules that maximize
their ability to make discretionary decisions and those rules that enable a judge to make
such decisions quickly and with a minimum of outside interference."), with Judith Resnik,
Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in
Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2119, 2140-42 (2000) (suggesting that
one result of the rise of managerial judging is that courts are more willing to award fees).
But cf Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining theJudiciary's Imperiled
Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1214-16 (1996) (questioning whetherjudicial self-
interest is explanatory ofjudicial behavior).
151. Generally speaking, exceptions to the American Rule must be evidenced by
(among other things) "'explicit statutory authority.'" Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602 (quoting
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994)). Given that Rule 41 (a)(2) does
not explicitly mention attorneys' fees, the ability of a court to award fees under that prong of
the rule might be questioned. Cf Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 E3d 868, 875 (6th Cir.
2000) (raising but not deciding issue in the context of holding that attorneys' fees are not
awardable under Rule 41(d)); MARCUS, supra note 3, at 206 (also raising but not resolving
issue). One response to this argument is that Rule 41(a)(2) is in effect a negotiation be-
tween the court and the plaintiff. Rogers, 230 F.3d at 875. The plaintiff is free to refuse any
condition imposed and continue to litigate the case. See note 58 and accompanying text
supra. Thus, the plaintiff and the court can be considered to be contracting around the
interpretative rule.
Another response is to limit an award of attorneys' fees to those cases "where the underly-
ing statute that is the basis of the original action permits the recovery of fees as costs."
Esposito v. Piatrowski, 223 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2000). This would encompass many federal
question cases brought under statutes with fee shifting provisions, but would leave out some
federal question cases and presumably many diversity actions. Yet another related problem
in interpreting or amending Rule 41 (a) (2) as suggested is that it might arguably run afoul
of the substantive rights provision of the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) ("Such
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."). Compare Marek v. Chesny,
473 U.S. 1, 35-38 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Rule 68 should not be
construed to cover attorneys' fees in light of proviso), with Business Guides, Inc. v. Chro-
matic Comm. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 553 (1991) (attorneys' fees can be awarded as a
sanction for violation of Rule 11).
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Finally, an alternative would be to make the award of attorneys'
fees a rebuttable presumption. This, too, reflects language in those
cases that award attorneys' fees in this context.152 The presumption
could be rebutted by the plaintiff by relying on one or more of the
factors that courts have employed to resolve Rule 41(a) (2) mo-
tions. It will be incumbent on the plaintiff to persuade the court
that an award of attorneys'fees is inappropriate. The most persua-
sive factors here would be those peculiar to that suit (e.g., that
there were unusual reasons for the plaintiff to wish to drop the suit
now, or that the case took unexpected turns due in whole or in
part to events beyond the control of the plaintiff), or of interest to
the public (e.g., that the public interest in this type of litigation
would be disserved by awarding fees). A corollary to the presump-
tion would be the possibility of awarding only a partial amount of
the reasonable attorneys' fee incurred by defendant.
This regime has obvious additional costs. To the extent that the
parties cannot agree on the amount, courts will need to expend
time holding hearings to award costs and attorneys' fees to the de-
fendant. This should not generate much satellite litigation. Courts
need only apply well-established guidelines developed for fee-
shifting statutes. Furthermore, the proposed reform will no
doubt deter some filings of lawsuits. Some of those filings other-
wise would have been dismissed within the window of opportunity
(and hence no hearing would have occurred) or without (with a
hearing on fees required unless the parties agreed). How much
deterrence will take place overall will no doubt depend on a num-
ber of factors. To the extent that the plaintiffs lawyers strategically
take the existence of the option into account ex ante, there might
be fewer filings. In contrast, to the extent voluntary dismissals are
The only comprehensive way to deal with all of these problems may be by statutory
amendment.
152. See, e.g,, Marlow v. Winston & Strawn, 19 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Typically, a
court imposes as a term and condition of dismissal that plaintiff pay the defendant the ex-
penses he has incurred in defending the suit, which usually includes reasonable attorneys'
fees.") (emphasis added).
153. See, supra Part IV B. As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, the lodestar ap-
proach has become the "guiding light" for fee-shifting determinations. Gisbrecht v.
Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002) (internal citation omitted). As the Court explained:
'ideally, ... litigants will settle the amount of a fee.' But where settlement between
the parties is not possible, 'the most useful starting point for [court determination
of] the amount of a reasonable fee [payable by the loser] is the number of hours rea-
sonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.'
Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
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due to factors ex post the filing (for example change of mind or
mistaken assumptions), there will be less deterrence. 54
The Blumenthal v. Drudge litigation described at the outset of this
Article can be used as an illustration of the proposed reform. Re-
call that the parties settled the case by agreeing to a payment of
$2500 from plaintiffs to defendant, a consensual arrangement
permitted by Rule 41(a) (1) (ii). While the other prongs of Rule
41 (a) (1) and (2) did not explicitly come into play, surely the set-
tlement was influenced by the availability (or lack thereof) of other
options. The case was in litigation for over three full years, and ap-
parently both sides had spent tens of thousands of dollars in
attorneys'fees 155 With the prospect of still more depositions and
fees, "the Blumenthals just wanted out,'' 1s6 in the fourth year of liti-
gation.
Under a broad voluntary dismissal option, like that still available
in some states, the Blumenthals could have dropped the suit right
then with no strings attached. On its face, this result does not seem
particularly fair to the defendant or to the court. The acerbic
Drudge is perhaps not the most sympathetic defendant to some,
but he did apparently spend large sums in defending the suit.
Likewise, the court must have devoted much time to the suit, as
evidenced by its ruling on numerous motions in the case. 57 So, a
unilateral dismissal would not have addressed the time and money
spent by defendant and the court.
The plaintiffs were of course long past the window of opportu-
nity to so dismiss under Rule 41 (a) (1) (i), and under our proposed
154. Thanks to Bob Bone for his helpful comments on the points explored in this para-
graph, and elsewhere in this article.
155. The precise figures are not expressly mentioned in the otherwise comprehensive
discussion of the case. See Parloff, supra note 6. The estimates in the text come from refer-
ences to the Blumenthals incurring thousands of dollars in attorneys'fees. Id. at 111-12. It
seems difficult to believe that Drudge did not spend similar amounts.
156. Id. at 112.
157. The district judge issued at least three rulings in the case. Blumenthal v. Drudge,
992 ESupp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, No. 97-1968(PLF), 186 ER.D. 236 (D.D.C. 1999) (ruling on various
discovery motions); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1749 (D.D.C. Feb. 13,
2001) (denying defendant's special motion to dismiss based on California's anti-SLAPP stat-
ute). The district court also rendered decisions on other motions not reflected in these
three reported decisions. Parloff, supra note 6, at 109, 111. In addition, the parties met on at
least one occasion at the suggestion of the district judge, with a U.S. Magistrate Judge to
discuss discovery issues. Id. at 112.
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reform, so they had to negotiate with the defendant or seek the
court's permission. They chose the former. What if they had cho-
sen the latter? Under the proposed reform, they could have
obtained a dismissal, without prejudice, by paying the reasonable
costs and attorneys'fees incurred by Drudge. If considered as a re-
buttable presumption, did the Blumenthals have any good reasons
not to pay costs and fees? Possibly. The case was unusual in ways
beyond the high-profile nature of the parties. It raised several rela-
tively unsettled issues of libel law, 11 and the case arguably took an
unexpected twist in favor of Drudge in November 2000. It was at
that point that the district judge, after "a long period of delibera-
tion, "'5 ruled in favor of Drudge on his motion to delay his
deposition. That meant that the Blumenthals would need to take
"at least 10 and possibly as many as 25"'6 other depositions before
deposing Drudge, which reportedly would alone add up to
"$30,000 to $50,000 in additional expenses. " 161 In these circum-
stances, the Blumenthals could have made a case that they should
not pay any fees at all, or at least a reduced amount. Perhaps the
$2500 they actually paid comes close to the appropriate reduced
amount.
V. CONCLUSION
A plaintiff abandoning a suit she has initiated is surely an odd,
though not particularly unusual, event. Various legal regimes have
embraced various options to permit the plaintiff to so dismiss uni-
laterally. When those options are not unlimited, the plaintiff has
been permitted to dismiss by permission of a court. Typically courts
in those instances consider an array of factors, both to determine if
the defendant would suffer "legal prejudice" by such a dismissal,
and if conditions should be attached to the dismissal.
Parts of the current scheme, as reflected in practice in federal
courts, ought to be left intact, or marginally modified. Other parts,
however, should be deregulated. In particular, a court should
automatically grant permission to a plaintiff to dismiss without
prejudice, as long as plaintiff pays the reasonable costs and attor-
158. Parloff, supra note 6, at 104-05 (discussing the application of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996); id. at 106-08 (discussing defenses raised by Drudge).
159. Id.at 111.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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neys' fees incurred by the defendant up to that point. Voluntary
dismissals are helpful to a plaintiff, but often prejudicial to the de-
fendant and the court system. The reforms outlined will better
balance those interests.
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APPENDIX
1. Alabama: ALA. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1) (i) (2002):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of this state, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a no-
tice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of
an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first
occurs ....
2. Alaska: ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1) (a) (2002):
Dismissal of Actions.
(a) Voluntary Dismissal-Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff-By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66 and of any statute of the state, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without an order of the court: [a] by fil-
ing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, which-
ever first occurs ....
3. Arizona: ARIz. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1)(A) (2003):
Dismissal of action
(a) Voluntary dismissal; by plaintiff or by order of court; effect
1. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c), or Rule 66(c), or of
any statute, an action may be dismissed (A) by the plaintiff without
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before ser-
vice by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary
judgment, whichever first occurs ....
4. Arkansas: ARK. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1) (2002):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof
(1) Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(d) and Rule 66, an ac-
tion may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action by the
plaintiff before the final submission of the case to the jury, or to
the court where the trial is by the court....
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5. California: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 581(b) (1) (West 1976 &
Supp. 2003):
(b) An action may be dismissed in any of the following instances:
(1) With or without prejudice, upon written request of the
plaintiff to the clerk, filed with papers in the case, or by oral or
written request to the court at any time before the actual com-
mencement of the trial, upon payment of the costs, if any.
6. Colorado: COLO. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1)(A) (2003):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff" by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court upon payment of costs: (A) By
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before filing or service by the
adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment,
whichever first occurs ....
7. Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-80 (1991 & Supp. 2003):
Nonsuits and withdrawals; costs
If the plaintiff, in any action returned to the court and entered
in the docket, does not, on or before the opening of the court on
the second day thereof, appear by himself or attorney to prosecute
such action, he shall be nonsuited, in which case the defendant, if
he appears, shall recover costs from the plaintiff. The plaintiff may
withdraw any action so returned to and entered in the docket of
any court, before the commencement of a hearing on the merits
thereof....
8. Delaware: DEL. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(I) (2003):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal: (1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Except as
otherwise provided by statute, an action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before trial or before the service by the defendant of a de-
mand for bill of particulars or other discovery or by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all the parties who appeared in
the action....
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9. District of Columbia: D.C. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1)(i) (2002):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal: Effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(e), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of Court (i) by filing a no--
tice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of
an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first
occurs ....
10. Florida: FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a) (1) (A) (2003):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal
(1) By Parties. Except in actions in which property has been
seized or is in the custody of the court, an action may be dismissed
by plaintiff without order of court (A) before trial by serving, or
during trial by stating on the record, a notice of dismissal at any
time before a hearing on motion for summary judgment ....
11. Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-41 (a) (2003):
Dismissal of actions
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof Subject to the provisions of
subsection (c) of Code Section 9-11-23, of Code Section 9-11-66,
and of any statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff,
without order or permission of the court, by filing a written notice
of dismissal at any time before the plaintiff rests his case....
12. Hawaii: HAw. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1) (A) (2003):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal: Effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. An action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court (A) by filing a notice of dis-
missal at any time before the return date as provided in Rule 12(a)
or service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for
summaryjudgment ....
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13. Idaho: IDAHO R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1)(i) (2002):
Dismissal of Actions-Voluntary Dismissal-Effect thereof-
By plaintiff-By stipulation.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 73, and of any
statute of the state of Idaho an action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, whichever occurs first ....
14. Illinois: 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1009(a) (2002):
Voluntary dismissal. (a) The plaintiff may, at any time before
trial or hearing begins, upon notice to each party who has ap-
peared or each such party's attorney, and upon payment of costs,
dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant,
without prejudice, by order filed in the cause.
15. Indiana: IND. R. TRIAL P. 41 (A) (1) (a) (2003):
Dismissal of actions
(A) Voluntary dismissal: Effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff-By stipulation. Subject to contrary provisions of
these rules or of any statute, an action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court:
(a) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by
the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judg-
ment, whichever first occurs ....
16. Iowa: IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.943 (2003):
Voluntary dismissal
A party may, without order of court, dismiss that party's own pe-
tition, counter-claim, cross-claim, cross-petition or petition of
intervention, at any time up until ten days before the trial is sched-
uled to begin .....
17. Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-241(a)(1) (i) (2003):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. (1) By Plaintiff by Stipu-
lation. Subject to the provisions of subsection (e) of K.S.A. 60-223
and amendments thereto and of any statute of the state, an action
may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by fil-
ing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, which-
ever first occurs ....
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18. Kentucky: Ky. R. Civ. P. 41.01 (1) (2002):
Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23.05, of Rule 66, and of any
statute, an action, or any claim therein, may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court, by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a mo-
tion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
19. Louisiana: LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1671 (West 1990 &
Supp. 2003):
Voluntary dismissal.
A judgment dismissing an action without prejudice shall be ren-
dered upon application of the plaintiff and upon his payment of
all costs, if the application is made prior to any appearance of re-
cord by the defendant....
20. Maine: ME. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1)(i) (2002):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(e) and of any statute, an action may be dismissed by the plain-
tiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of any mo-
tion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
21. Maryland: MD. R. Civ. P. 2-506(a) (2003):
Voluntary dismissal.
(a) By notice of dismissal or stipulation. Except as otherwise
provided in these rules or by statute, a plaintiff may dismiss an ac-
tion without leave of court (1) by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before the adverse party files an answer or a motion for sum-
maryjudgment ....
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22. Massachusetts: MASS. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1)(i) (2003):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of these
rules and of any statute of this Commonwealth, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a no-
tice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of
an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first
occurs ....
23. Michigan: MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.504(A) (1) (a) (2003):
Dismissal of Actions
(A) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect.
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of MCR
2.420 and MCR 3.501 (E), an action may be dismissed by the plain-
tiff without an order of the court and on the payment of costs
(a) by filing a notice of dismissal before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion under MCR 2.116, whichever
first occurs ....
24. Minnesota: MINN. R. Civ. P. 41.01 (a) (1) (2003):
Dismissal of Actions
Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof
(a) By Plaintiff by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rules
23.05, 23.06 and 66, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (1) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for
summary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
25. Mississippi: Miss. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1)(i) (2002):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof
(1) By Plaintiff" By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
66, or of any statute of the State of Mississippi, and upon the pay-
ment of all costs, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court:
(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the
adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment,
whichever first occurs ....
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26. Missouri: Mo. R. Civ. P. 67.02 (2002):
Voluntary Dismissal-Effect of
(a) Except as provided in Rule 52, a civil action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of the court anytime:
(1) Prior to the swearing of the jury panel for the voir dire ex-
amination, or
(2) In cases tried without ajury, prior to the introduction of evi-
dence....
27. Montana: MONT. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i) (2002):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal-Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff-By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the state of Montana, an
action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the ad-
verse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment,
which ever first occurs ....
28. Nebraska: NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-601(1) (2003):
Dismissal without prejudice.
An action may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action
(1) by the plaintiff, before the final submission of the case to the
jury, or to the court where the trial is by the court.
29. Nevada: NEv. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1) (i) (2001):
Dismissal of Actions
a) Voluntary dismissal: Effect thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff upon repayment of defendants' filing fees, without
order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for sum-
mary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
30. New Hampshire: Total Service, Inc. v. Promotional Printers, Inc.,
525 A.2d 273, 275 (N.H. 1987) (no statute):
"[A] plaintiff could be granted a nonsuit prior to the onset of
the trial on the merits, but that the granting of the motion was sub-
ject to the discretion of the court."
Dewgulating Voluntary Dismissals
31. NewJersey: N.J. R. Civ. PRAc. 4:37-1 (a) (2003):
(a) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of R.
4:32-4 (class actions), R. 4:53-1 (receivership actions) and R. 4:60-
18 (attachment actions), an action may be dismissed by the plain-
tiff without court order by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for
summary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
32. New Mexico: N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-041 (A)(1)(a) (2003):
A. Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) Subject to the provisions of Paragraph E of Rule 1-023
NMRA and of any statute, an action may be dismissed by the plain-
tiff without order of the court:
(a) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by
the adverse party of an answer or other responsive pleading ....
33. New York: N.Y C.P.L.R. 3217(a) (1) (Mc Kinney 2003):
Voluntary discontinuance.
(a) Without an order. Any party asserting a claim may discon-
tinue it without an order.
1. by serving upon all parties to the action a notice of discon-
tinuance at any time before a responsive pleading is served or
within twenty days after service of the pleading asserting the claim,
whichever is earlier, and filing the notice with proof of service with
the clerk of the court ....
34. North Carolina: N.C. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1) (i) (2003):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c) and of any statute of this State, an action or any claim
therein may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the plaintiff rests
his case ....
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35. North Dakota: N.D. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i) (2002):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal-Effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; By stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(1), of Rule 66, and of any statute of this state, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court, unless a provi-
sional remedy has been allowed, (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
36. Ohio: OHIO R. Civ. P. 41 (A) (1)(a) (2002):
Dismissal of actions
(A) Voluntary dismissal: effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Civ. R.
23(E), Civ. R. 23.1, and Civ. R. 66, a plaintiff, without order of
court, may dismiss all claims asserted by that plaintiff against a de-
fendant by doing either of the following:
(a) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the com-
mencement of trial unless a counterclaim which cannot remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court has been
served by that defendant ....
37. Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 683 (2001):
Dismissal of action-Grounds and time
An action may be dismissed, without prejudice to a future ac-
tion:
First, By the plaintiff, before the final submission of the case to
the jury, or to the court, where the trial is by the court....
38. Oregon: OR. R. Civ. P. 54 (2003):
Dismissal of Actions; Compromise
A. Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof.
A(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
32 D and of any statute of this state, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court (a) by filing a notice of dis-
missal with the court and serving such notice on the defendant not
less than five days prior to the day of trial if no counterclaim has
been pleaded ....
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39. Pennsylvania: PA. R. Civ. P. 229(a) (2003):
Discontinuance
(a) A discontinuance shall be the exclusive method of voluntary
termination of an action, in whole or in part, by the plaintiff before
commencement of the trial.
40. Rhode Island: R.I. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1)(i) (2003):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof
(1)By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(e), of Rule 66(j), and of any statute of this state, an action may
be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party
of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first
occurs ....
41. South Carolina: S.C. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1)(i) (1976):
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23 (c), of Rule 66(a), and of any statute, an action may be dismissed
by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing and serving a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party
of an answer or motion for summary judgment, whichever first oc-
curs ....
42. South Dakota: S.D. R. Civ. P. § 15-6-41 (a) (2002):
(a) Voluntary dismissal-Effect thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of § 15-
6-23(e), of § 15-6-66, and of any statute of this state, an action may
be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of the court
(a) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by
the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judg-
ment, whichever first occurs ....
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43. Tennessee: TENN. R. Civ. P. 41.01(1) (2002):
Voluntary Dismissal-Effect Thereof
(1) Subject to the provisions of Rule 23.05, Rule 23.06, or Rule
66 or of any statute, and except when a motion for summary judg-
ment made by an adverse party is pending, the plaintiff shall have
the right to take a voluntary nonsuit to dismiss an action without
prejudice by filing a written notice of dismissal at any time before
the trial of a cause and serving a copy of the notice upon all par-
ties, and if a party has not already been served with a summons and
complaint, the plaintiff shall also serve a copy of the complaint on
that party ....
44. Texas: TEx. R. Civ. P. 162 (2002):
Dismissal or Non-suit
At any time before the plaintiff has introduced all of his evi-
dence other than rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff may dismiss a
case, or take a non-suit, which shall be entered in the minutes....
45. Utah: UTAH R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1) (2002):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof
(1) By plaintiff Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule
66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or other
response to the complaint permitted under these rules....
46. Vermont: VT. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1) (i) (2002):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23 (e), of Rule 66, and of any statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal
at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
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47. Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Michie 2000 & Supp.
2002):
Dismissal of action by nonsuit.-A. A party shall not be allowed
to suffer a nonsuit as to any cause of action or claim, or any other
party to the proceeding, unless he does so before a motion to
strike the evidence has been sustained or before the jury retires
from the bar or before the action has been submitted to the court
for decision....
48. Washington: WASH. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1)(B) (2003):
Dismissal of Actions
(a) Voluntary Dismissal.
(1) Mandatory. Subject to the provisions of rules 23(e) and 23.1,
any action shall be dismissed by the court:
(B) By Plaintiff Before Resting. Upon motion of the plaintiff at
any time before plaintiff rests at the conclusion of his opening
case.
49. West Virginia: W. VA. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1) (i) (1998):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof-(1) By plaintiff; by stipula-
tion.-Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of
any statute of the State, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for
summary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
50. Wisconsin: Wis. R. Civ. P. 805.04(1) (2003):
Voluntary dismissal: effect thereof
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. An action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court by serving and filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by an adverse party of respon-
sive pleading or motion ....
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51. Wyoming: Wvo. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1)(i) (2002):
Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23 (c), of Rule 66, and of any statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court: (i) by filing a notice of dis-
missal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer
or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs ....
